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One of the most striking features of the transitions to democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has been the spectacular growth in the role 
and prominence of constitutional courts and tribunals in shaping the new 
constitutional order. Before the fall of communism there existed only two 
constitutional tribunals in CEE: in Yugoslavia since 1963 and in Poland since 
1985.* 1 While they were not exactly sham institutions, their position was hardly 
one that allowed the exercise of a robust constitutional review. Quite apart from 
the legal definitions of their competence, the genuine powers of both were 
inevitably subject to the restrictions stemming from Communist party rule. The 
situation today is one in which all the post-communist countries of CEE have 
constitutional courts, and while the effectiveness of these tribunals varies, they 
have without exception stamped their authority on the process of constitutional 
transition. Many of them have performed a wide range of constitutionally 
prescribed roles, including overseeing elections and referenda, deciding upon 
the prohibition of political parties and adjudicating on the conflicts of 
competencies between state institutions. The most significant impact of 
constitutional tribunals however has been in that area which is the central focus 
of this Working Paper: the review of enacted law. Evaluating statutes for their 
consistency with the constitution is probably the most significant -  and 
undoubtedly the most controversial -  function that constitutional courts perform 
in CEE, and elsewhere in the world.
At least some of the constitutional courts of the region have dealt with 
national legislation in a manner contrary to the wishes of the parliamentary
Professor in the Department of Law, European University Institute. Thanks are due to 
Navraj Ghaleigh, Victoria Jennett and Ania Slinn for their editorial and research assistance.
1 It was actually in 1982 that the constitutional amendment creating the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal was passed but not until 1985 that the statute on the Constitutional Tribunal, which 
established a specific basis for that body, was enacted. The Tribunal began its operations in 
January 1986.
For the sake of completeness, mention should also be made of the Czechoslovakian 
Constitutional Court of the interwar period, although it was a rather insignificant body, see 
Herman Schwartz, The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe 



























































































majorities and governments of the day. Important aspects of laws on abortion,2 
the death penalty,3 4 “lustration” (the screening of officials suspected of 
improprieties under the auspices of the ancien regime),* criminal prosecution of 
former communist officials responsible for crimes against the people during the 
communist period,5 economic austerity measures,6 fiscal policy,7 citizenship
2 See, e.g., Decision of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 28 May 1997, no. K. 26/96 , in 
Orzecznictwo Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego, Rok 1997 [Case Law o f the Constitutional 
Tribunal, 1997], (Warszawa: C.H. Beck 1998), pp. 173-246. This decision was reprinted in 
East European Case Reporter o f Constitutional Im w  6 (1999), pp. 38-129. The decision 
invalidated certain amendments of June 1994 to Penal Code which liberalized abortion 
rights, and is discussed below, in Part III of this Working Paper. See also the decision of 
Hungarian Constitutional Court of 17 December 1991, no. 64/1991, reprinted in Laszlo 
Solyom & Georg Brunner, Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy: The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2000), pp. 178-203.
3 The abolition of the death penalty was decided by the constitutional courts in Lithuania, 
Albania, Ukraine and Hungary. For the text of the Hungarian Court’s decision declaring 
capital punishment unconstitutional (decision 23/1990 of 31 October 1990) see Solyom & 
Brunner, supra note 2 at pp. 118-38; the decision was also reprinted in East European Case 
Reporter o f Constitutional Law 1 (no. 2) (1994) at pp. 177-205.
4 For example, in Hungary the Constitutional Court found a number of constitutional 
problems with the law on lustration passed by the Parliament early in 1994 (Decision no. 
60/1994. of 22 December 1994, reprinted in East European Case Reporter o f Constitutional 
Law 2 (1995) pp. 159-193). In order to comply with the Court’s decision, the Parliament had 
to rewrite the law which it did by July 1996. The new law (passed by the Parliament 
dominated by a different majority horn that in 1994) greatly reduced the scope of lustration. 
For a discussion, see Gabor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, “Living Well Is the Best 
Revenge: The Hungarian Approach to Judging the Past”, in A. James McAdams (ed), 
Transitional Justice and the Rule o f Law in New Democracies (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press 1997), pp. 155-84 at pp. 177-8. Lustration laws were also struck down, or 
substantially weakened, by Constitutional Courts in Albania and Bulgaria, see Ruti Teitel, 
“Post-Communist Constitutionalism: A Transitional Perspective”, Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review 26(1994), pp. 167-90 at pp. 180-82.
5 In a Decision 11/1992 of 5 March 1992 the Hungarian Constitutional Court struck down An 
Act Concerning the Right to Prosecute Serious Criminal Offences committed between 21 
December 1944 and 2 May 1990 that Had Not Been Prosecuted for Political Reasons of 4 
November 1991. The effect of the statute would have been to extend retrospectively statutory 
period of limitation during which offences occurring in the 1956 massacres could be 
prosecuted. The decision is reprinted in Solyom & Brunner, supra note 2 at pp. 214-28.
For example, the Hungarian Constitutional Court struck down important aspects of a 
number of laws which were meant to constitute a package of austerity measures introduced 
by the Government in 1995; see e.g. decision 43/1995 of 30 June 1995 on social security 
benefits, reprinted in Solyom & Brunner, supra note 2 at pp. 323-32.
7 See, e.g., the decision of Polish Constitutional Tribunal; no. K 8/97 of 16 December 1997 
striking down a number of provisions of the tax statute of 26 July 1991, reprinted in 
Orzecznictwo Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego, Rok 1997 [Case Law o f the Constitutional 




























































































requirements,8 personal identification numbers for citizens,9 and indexation of 
pensions,10 have all been struck down. It is no coincidence that the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court figures so prominently in this list of examples. It is perhaps 
the most activist constitutional court not only in the CEE but also in the world.11 
More importantly for present purposes, according to one of its leading 
commentators, “[i]t serves as the exemplar for every new Constitutional Court 
in Central Europe”.12 Some of these decisions have had enormous financial and 
budgetary implications; some transgressed clear and strong majority feelings 
and others rode roughshod over delicately crafted political compromises. There 
have been decisions taken on the basis of perceived irregularities in law-making 
procedures and in the constitutional divisions of powers among the lawmaking 
bodies, but far-reaching decisions have also been based on the constitutional 
justices’ interpretations of vague and unclear constitutional substantive 
provisions on which reasonable people may disagree.
While there are certain local variations, one may attempt a description of 
the common model of a constitutional tribunal in the region. The model adopted 
is that of a “concentrated” or ’’centralised” constitutional review, conducted by a 
court composed of judges appointed for limited tenure by political branches of 
government, exercising abstract, ex-post and final review of constitutionality of 
statutes and other infra-constitutional acts. There are, however, also some 
departures from the dominant model which I will now briefly note.
Centralised and concentrated review is understood as an arrangement by 
which only one institution in each of these countries has the right authoritatively
8 In Slovenia, the Constitutional Court decided Case No. U-I-206/97, annulling on 17 June 
1998 part of a law on the amendments to the Law on Foreigners. The amendments would 
change the required period before an immigrant could apply for permanent resident status 
from three to eight years. See “Constitution Watch”, East European Constitutional Review 1 
no. 3 (1998) pp. 36-37.
9 On 13 April 1991, the Hungarian Constitutional Court declared the use of uniform personal 
identification numbers unconstitutional, decision 15/1991, reprinted in Solyom & Brunner, 
supra note 2 at pp. 139-50.
10 Croatian Constitutional Court invalidated in 1998 a provision of the 1993 Code on 
Equating Retirement Incomes on the basis that the code demanded that pensions increase 
relative to changes in the cost of living rather than relative to the increase of average 
incomes, see “Constitution Watch”, East European Constitutional Review 1 no. 3 (1998), p. 
9. Polish Constitutional Tribunal ruled on 17 July 1996 that a 1995 law which would suspend 
the indexation of pensions in the forth quarter of 1996 was unconstitutional, Decision K. 8/96 
in Orzecznictwo Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego, Rok 1996 [Case Law o f the Constitutional 
Tribunal, 1996], vol. 2 (Warszawa: C.H. Beck 1998), pp. 46-65..
11 This is the view of Wiktor Osiatynski, “Rights in New Constitutions of East Central 
Europe”, Columbia Human Rights Law Review 26 (1994), pp. 111-166 at p. 151; see also Jon 
Elster, “Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea”, 
Public Administration 71 (1993) pp. 169-217 at p. 199.
12 Spencer Zifcak, “Hungary’s Remarkable, Radical, Constitutional Court”, Journal of 




























































































to scrutinise laws for their constitutionality. No ordinary judge has such a right. 
The most they can do if they have doubts about constitutionality of a legal rule 
which they are called on to apply, is to suspend the proceedings and refer the 
question to the Constitutional Court (so-called “concrete review”). The rule 
against the ordinary judiciary’s power to strike down infra-constitutional law is 
very strict, based as it is on fear of a possible threat to the unity of the legal 
system should individual judges have such power. But it is also based on more 
contingent factors. The regular judiciary in these countries, following a 
continental model, enjoys a relatively low status and cannot be trusted (in the 
views of constitution makers) with making such momentous judgements as the 
compatibility of a statutory provision with the Constitution.
Hence, this task is conferred upon a special body, established outside the 
regular judicial system, and often regulated by constitutional provisions separate 
from the chapters on the judiciary.13 The only, and minor, exception is Estonia 
where the constitutional court is known as the “Chamber of Constitutional 
Review” and is structurally a part of the National Court (the equivalent of the 
Supreme Court). This, however, does not importantly affect its position in the 
overall constitutional system and, for all practical purposes, the Estonian 
Chamber can be viewed as a constitutional court, like any other in the region.
Judges of constitutional courts are appointed for a limited tenure, usually 
for nine years.14 With very few exceptions, constitutional justices tend to be 
either legal scholars (with a marked preponderance of constitutional law 
professors) or senior members of the “regular” judiciary. The appointment 
process is thoroughly political, although “high legal qualifications” (or an 
equivalent description) are usually listed as one of the criteria of eligibility. In 
most Central and Eastern European countries, constitutional judges are 
appointed in a process which requires the participation of both the legislative 
and executive branches (Romania, Albania. Czech Republic, Slovakia, Russia, 
etc). In some countries, the highest bodies representing the judiciary are also 
involved (Bulgaria, Lithuania and Ukraine). Two of the most active 
constitutional courts of the region constitute an exception. In both Hungary and 
Poland, constitutional justices are appointed exclusively by the parliaments. 
This has been criticised by an eminent Polish legal scholar (who is also 
currently a constitutional court judge) as creating a “risk of excessive 
politicisation” of the appointment process.15
13 For example, the provisions regarding constitutional courts are separate from the chapters 
on the judiciary in the constitutions of Romania, Hungary, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Ukraine. 
In the constitutions of Slovakia, Czech Republic, Russia and Poland constitutional courts are 
governed by constitutional regulations alongside the judicial bodies.
4 Although different limits may apply: 6 years in Moldova, 8 years in Croatia, 10 years in the 
Czech Republic.
15 Leszek Garlicki, “Trybunal Konstytucyjny w projekcie Komisji Konstytucyjnej 




























































































The most important power of Constitutional Courts, for present purposes, is 
their exercise of abstract judicial review. This means that the statutory rule is 
considered not in the actual context of a specific case but in abstracto. It is the 
textual dimension of the rule, rather than its life in the application to real people 
and real legal controversies, which is assessed by judges in comparison with 
their understanding of the text of a relevant constitutional rule. Most of these 
courts also exercise a power of concrete review, initiated by other courts,16 and 
some of them (Hungary, Poland, Slovenia etc) will also hear citizens’ 
constitutional complaints, brought by those individuals who believe that their 
constitutional rights have been violated by a judicial and/or administrative 
decision issued on the basis of the infra-constitutional law, the constitutionality 
of which is questionable. However, it is the “abstract” review initiated by other 
bodies (the President, the government) or by a group of MPs (usually, members 
of the minority outvoted on a law which they subsequently challenge before the 
Court) which raises the gravest legitimacy problems. It is on such occasions that 
the clash of different views about what an open textured constitutional norm 
“really” means occurs with the greatest severity, and the question “who should 
have the last word?” seems most apposite.
Abstract review is problematic for a number of reasons. From the 
perspective of the division of authority between the legislature and the 
constitutional court, abstract review is troubling for the reason that it is often 
initiated by those political actors dissatisfied with a majoritarian decision of the 
parliament -  that is, they lost the debate. It also makes no necessary allowance 
for those principles which reduce the clash between the legislature and the 
judiciary where the review of constitutionality is dependent upon consideration 
of a specific case. Consider the doctrines elaborated by the United States 
Supreme Court that the court will avoid deciding “political questions”, or cases 
which are not “ripe” enough, or which are “moot”, all of which constrain judges 
from deciding questions of constitutionality. But no such doctrines are relevant 
to the system of “abstract” review. A challenge to recently passed legislation, 
depending on its substance, may be very much a “political question”, is “ripe” 
automatically when the law is passed, and will not cease being “moot” as long 
as the law is on the books.
It has been mentioned above that the dominant model in Central and 
Eastern Europe is of an ex-post review, that is, review of the laws already 
enacted, although there are some exceptions. In Romania, abstract review can 
apply only to statutes adopted by the Parliament but before the promulgation 
(while there is also a path open for a concrete review, initiated by courts, which 
by its very nature can be only ex post). This resembles the position of the 
French Conseil constitutionnel which also can review parliamentary acts only 
before promulgation. Further, some other constitutional courts in the region (in




























































































Poland, Hungary and Estonia), in addition to their more routine, ex-post review, 
can be asked by the respective Presidents to conduct an ex-ante review of the 
act just passed by the Parliament, and one court (in Hungary) can even be asked 
to issue an advisory opinion about a bill not yet voted on by the Parliament. 
There is however a marked tendency to view the prospective review and 
advisory opinions as the exception rather than the rule.
With the exception of Romania, decisions about the unconstitutionality 
of statutes in all Central and Eastern European countries are final, and there is 
no way of reversing the verdict other than by a constitutional amendment. In 
Romania, verdicts of the Constitutional Court resulting from an abstract review, 
conducted prior to promulgation, can be overridden by a two-thirds majority of 
both chambers. In Poland, a similar possibility existed until the Constitution of 
1997 introduced the finality of all Constitutional Court decisions.
Finally, it should be mentioned that constitutional courts in the region - 
consistently with their Western European prototypes -  perform a number of 
other functions such as deciding in cases of conflict regarding powers of other 
constitutional bodies, the status of political parties, the constitutionality of 
international treaties, and elections or referendums. These matters, however, lie 
beyond the scope of this working paper.
My purpose here is to discuss the main aspects of the phenomenon of the 
emergence of Constitutional Courts in CEE, insofar as they are relevant to their 
quest for legitimacy. I will begin by an account of the ways in which the 
constitutional doctrine supplies the legitimating justifications to those Courts 
(Part II). I shall then turn to the issue of the place of the constitutional court in 
the overall architecture of the branches of government, and more specifically, to 
the question of whether they belong to the judiciary or to the legislative branch, 
and what difference it makes to the legitimacy problem (Part III). The problem 
of legitimacy arises in the first place if we characterize those courts as “activist” 
rather than “restrained” or “deferential”, and so in Part IV I consider the 
grounds, if any, upon which we may indeed properly characterize those courts 
as “activist”. In Part V I review, and critically assess, various explanations 
given in constitutional theory for the adoption of this particular model of 
constitutional review which had emerged in CEE rather than, say, the 
“American model” which, as I argued elsewhere, raises fewer legitimacy 
problems.17 Finally, in Part VI the crucial issue of the finality of decisions of 
constitutional courts will be explored: do these courts indeed have a “last word” 
on the question of the validity of statutes, and what departures from the finality 
would alleviate the legitimacy concerns?
17 See Wojciech Sadurski, “Judicial Review, Separation of Powers and Democracy: The 
Problem of Activist Constitutional Tribunals in Postcommunist Central Europe”, Studi 




























































































II. Provision of legitimacy in constitutional discourse
Constitutional discourses in and about CEE -  that is, the accounts and 
analyses of constitutional developments, produced by the scholars, observers, 
lawyers and politicians -  have been extremely generous in their praise of 
constitutional courts. Indeed, in much of the scholarly discussions those courts 
have been credited with playing the central role in constitutional transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy; they are seen (in the words of a prominent 
American lawyer) as “the flagships of the rule of law and constitutional faith in 
the emergent Eastern European democracies”.18 They have been described as 
the promoters and defenders (often, nearly the only promoters and defenders) of 
the values of constitutionalism, the rule of law and human rights in political and 
legal environments contaminated by legal nihilism and marked by a disregard 
for individual rights and the lack of a tradition of Rechtsstaat. The following 
observation by Herman Schwartz, a distinguished American scholar and a 
perceptive student of post-communist constitutionalism, is fairly typical of the 
literature:
The performance of some of [the East European Constitutional] 
courts so far shows that despite the lack of a constitutional court 
tradition, men and women who don the robe of constitutional court 
judges can become courageous and vigorous defenders of 
constitutional principles and human rights, continuing the pattern 
shown elsewhere in the world.19
This is a heart-warming, feel-good story. It is a story about the 
courageous, principled, enlightened men and women of integrity who, 
notwithstanding the risks, take on the corrupt, ignorant, populist politicians. 
This is a story of the court as a noble “forum of principle” to be contrasted 
with the elected branches and their practices of horse-trading, political bargains 
and opportunistic deals. This is a story about a respect for paramount values, 
announced in a Constitution, but which are not for every mortal to be seen, as
18 Patricia M. Wald, Foreword, in Schwartz, supra note 1 at p. x. Wald, former Chief Judge of 
the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, is member of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
19 Herman Schwartz, ‘The New East European Constitutional Courts”, in A. E. Dick Howard 
(ed.), Constitution Making in Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press 1993), pp. 163-208 at p. 194. Another commentator, Spencer Zifcak, expressed his 
enthusiasm right in the title of his article “Hungary’s Remarkable, Radical, Constitutional 
Court”, supra note 12, and concluded his discussion of the Hungarian Court by saying that 
“[t]here have been few, more distinctive or valuable judicial contributions to emergent 



























































































they often remain “invisible”.20 The story is all the better since it is linked -  as 
in the passage from Professor Schwartz -  with a global story. The men and 
women who “don the robe of constitutional court judges” in Central and Eastern 
Europe are not alone. They belong to a small but distinguished community of 
constitutional judges around the world. And, consistently with “the pattern 
shown elsewhere in the world”, they will see to it that noble constitutionalism 
will prevail over dirty politics.
It is a nice story, but is it the whole story and is it an entirely accurate 
story? To be sure, among some of the most vocal opponents of constitutional 
tribunals in CEE were people like Presidents Lukashenka of Belarus or ex- 
President of Slovakia Meciar -  not exactly paragons of democracy. But the 
nastiness of your opponents does not necessarily place you beyond criticism. 
For all the importance of the emergence and growth of post-communist 
constitutional courts, the phenomenon has remained strangely under-theorized. 
Constitutional review has been applauded, celebrated and embraced with 
enthusiasm by constitutional observers and actors, within and outside the 
region, but rarely have the difficult questions of democratic legitimacy of those 
tribunals been raised.
And yet, one would think that these questions must arise whenever an 
unelected body exercises the power of annulling the decisions of electorally 
accountable bodies in a democracy, and that the best strategy for the courts 
themselves would be to face the problems of legitimacy squarely and openly. 
After all, as Alec Stone Sweet proclaims in his recent book on four powerful 
constitutional courts in Western Europe: “When the court annuls a bill on rights 
grounds, it substitutes its own reading of rights, and its own policy goals, for 
those of the parliamentary majority”.21 This applies to Western and to 
Central/Eastern European courts alike, and not just to the annulments on “rights 
grounds” but also on the grounds of inconsistency with such general 
constitutional clauses as “social justice” or “democratic state based on law”. 
However, the implications of this statement for the democratic theory and 
practice of post-communist polities have rarely been articulated in the discourse 
on constitutional tribunals.
In particular, rarely have the vexed issues of political legitimacy, 
institutional competence, and possible infringements of the political rights of 
citizens been discussed. These three dimensions are, however, obviously 
invoked whenever the last word on issue of rights protection or policy-setting
20 The concept of “invisible constitution” was coined by the (then) Chief Justice of the 
Hungarian Court, Laszlo Solyom, see Solyom & Brunner, supra note 2 at p. 41, see also 
Zifcak, supra note 12 at pp. 5-6.
21 Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges (Oxford University Press 2000), at p. 105. Note 
that the phrase by Stone Sweet is not made in a critical context, and is not accompanied by an 





























































































are placed in the hand of a body which is not accountable to the electorate in the 
way the parliaments (and governments controlled by the parliaments) are. 
Electorally accountable bodies, presumptively enjoy the paramount legitimate 
authority to decide on issues of policy on which the members of society 
disagree. The judiciary -  including constitutional courts -  is notoriously ill- 
equipped to evaluate options and choices on some issues, such as socio­
economic policies with important financial implications. Finally, placing the 
protection of certain rights and other political values (such as “social justice”) 
in the hands of constitutional courts simultaneously removes these spheres from 
the agenda of the elected bodies, and consequently restricts the capacity of 
citizens to participate in political decisions which affect the contours of such 
rights or political values. While, in itself, this is not a conclusive argument 
against such an institutional transfer of competence, a reduction in the 
enjoyment of political rights of citizens calls for a strong defence for such an 
institutional arrangement.
No such defences have been forthcoming from constitutional discourse in 
CEE, and the unproblematic character of the constitutional review of laws as 
exercised by constitutional courts has been, more or less, taken for granted." It 
has been assumed that if there is an interpretative clash concerning 
constitutional rights between the parliament and the constitutional court, the 
parliament must be wrong and the court must be right. Somehow, it has become 
a conventional wisdom that a majority of judges of the constitutional court 
(which may be as few as five)2 3 necessarily knows the “true” meaning of a 
constitutional right better than a majority of the parliamentary chamber. 
Consequently, the only significant critical voices about the institutional position 
of constitutional courts in post-communist systems have been that they are not 
powerful enough, not independent enough, not secure enough in the finality and 
enforceability of their judgements.
Why has the legitimacy of constitutional courts been taken for granted? Why 
have so few dissenting voices24 arisen in the constitutional discourse of CEE?
22 E.g., with respect to the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, Pavel Hollander 
reports: ‘The scope of the Constitutional Court’s powers, as defined by the Constitution, is 
not subject of a discussion in legal theory”, ‘The Role of the Czech Constitutional Court: 
Application of the Constitution in Case Decisions of Ordinary Courts”, Parker Sell. J.E.Eur. 
L. 4 (1997), pp. 445-65 at p. 447.
23 Constitutional Courts in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania 
and Slovenia have nine judges. Even smaller Courts exist in Moldova (6 judges) and 
Yugoslavia (7 judges).
24 These exceptions include Stephen Holmes, “Back to the Drawing Board”, East European 
Constitutional Review 2 no. 1 (1993) pp. 21-25 (‘To overlegitimate the (constitutional] court 
is to diminish the [parliamentary] assembly in the public’s eyes and to help discredit the 
nascent idea of representation through periodic elections”, id. at 23) and Andras Sajo, 
“Reading the Invisible Constitution: Judicial Review in Hungary”, Oxford Journal of Legal 




























































































One could perhaps be forgiven for offering simple answers formulated in terms 
of vested interests and institutional self-aggrandizement. After all, the 
constitutional discourses have been primarily produced by those who stand to 
gain the most from the theories supporting a strong role for constitutional 
courts: academic constitutional lawyers and constitutional judges themselves 
(the latter being largely drawn from the former). Self-congratulatory rhetoric 
supports both the position of the constitutional judiciary and law professors 
linked with each other in a symbiotic relationship. Strong constitutional review 
strengthens the status of academic constitutional lawyers (they get more 
material to work on -  not just the text of constitutional acts but also the case 
law, and also may hope to be cited in the judgments and -  the ultimate reward -  
find themselves one day on the bench), while the supportive doctrines produced 
by constitutional lawyers elevate the position of constitutional judges vis-à-vis 
political branches. Both phenomena are mutually sustaining.
Nothing in the preceding paragraph is restricted to CEE. Martin Shapiro 
has noted how the emergence and growth of constitutional review in Western 
Europe has affected favorably the fortunes of academic constitutional lawyers: 
“European constitutional law teachers went from the bottom of the pecking 
order of teachers of something like Freshman civics, to near the top of the order 
as constitutional judicial review came to flourish on the Continent. And just as 
that particular body of law made more of them, they made more of it”.25
This shift has been recognized -  though rarely -  by Western European 
academic constitutional lawyers and judges, too. Bernhard Schlink, who 
combines both these professional roles, has caustically noted the relationship 
between the German Constitutional Court and the constitutional academia in his 
country: “Karlsruhe locuta, causa finita -  this remark creates an image of this 
new situation, in which the Bundesverfassungsgericht speaks ex cathedra and 
representatives of dethroned constitutional scholarship stand at its feet”.26 He 
further remarked that constitutional scholarship has adapted to the BVG “as a 
sort of junior partner”, and that many constitutional law professors have 
behaved “as loyal compilers and systematizers of [BVG’s] decisions, even as 
possible candidates for future positions on the Court... Constitutional 
scholarship would like to participate in power, and it realizes that the courtiers 
are rewarded for their service to the royal court by being allowed to influence
East European Constitutional Review 5 no. 1 (1993) pp. 31-41. The author of this Working 
Paper contributed several articles critical of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and its powers 
in the opinion pages of Polish daily newspaper Rzeczpospolita.
25 Martin Shapiro, ‘The Success of Judicial Review”, in Sally J. Kenney, William M. 
Reisinger & John C. Reitz (eds), Constitutional Dialogues In Comparative Perspective 
(London: Macmillan 1999), pp. 193-219 at p. 214. See also, similarly, Stone Sweet, supra 
note 21 at pp. 146-9.
26 Bernhard Schlink, “German Constitutional Culture in Transition”, in Michel Rosenfeld 
(ed.), Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives 




























































































it”.27 It is significant that this mutually reinforcing relationship between the 
academic (mainly constitutional-law) community and the courts exercising 
constitutional review is a quasi-universal phenomenon, which can be 
ascertained not only in European legal systems but also in countries as remote 
from the continental model as Canada28 or New Zealand.29
There are, no doubt, also more profound reasons for the uncritical 
approaches to the constitutional courts in the region. The very high social 
standing of those courts, compared to other public institutions,30 is a 
consequence of, and stands in contrast with, the general disenchantment with 
political branches of the government. Not unlike post-war Germany,31 “politics” 
was largely discredited after the fall of Communism, and there has been a 
widespread, cynical conviction that politics is a dirty business. Being novel 
institutions (with the exceptions of Poland and Yugoslavia), constitutional 
courts did not have to bear the same general opprobrium as those tainted by 
their complicity in non-democratic practices. Further, in at least some of post­
communist countries (for instance, in Hungary), they were viewed by the then 
anti-communist, democratic opposition as one of very few institutional checks, 
agreed upon at the Round Table negotiations, upon the power of less-than- 
legitimate Parliament and government, dominated as they were by the 
Communists and their successor parties. Further, the two professional groups 
which provided the pool of candidates for judges of the constitutional courts -  
legal academics and the judiciary -  were popularly regarded as less 
“compromised” than the “political class”. (Even though the latter was largely 
composed of the new people, the pervading cynicism and lack of trust in 
politicians inherited from the ancien regime affected all politicians during the 
transition). Notwithstanding that legal academics -  and most of the justices of 
the post-communist Constitutional Courts have been law professors (in 
particular, constitutional law professors)32 -  were among the most conformist in
27 Id. p. 220.
28 See F.L. Morton, ‘The Charter Revolution and the Court Party”, Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 30 (1992) pp. 627-52 at pp. 641-2.
29 James Allan notes that “there has been a good deal of encouragement for the judiciary from 
the academy when the courts give themselves more power [to review statutes] under the [Bill 
of Rights] Act [of 1990]”, James Allan, ‘The Effect of a Statutory Bill of Rights Where 
Parliament is Sovereign: the Lessons from New Zealand”, conference paper presented at the 
workshop “Sceptical Approaches to Entrenched Human Rights”, King’s College, London, 23 
September 2000, at p.13 (footnotes omitted) (manuscript on file with the author).
30 See, e.g., on Hungary, Halmai & Scheppele, supra note 4 at p. 181, Figure 1. In 1995 
support for the Constitutional Court was 58 %, for the Parliament: 36 %, and for the 
Government, 35 %. For similar data in Slovakia and Czech Republic, see Schwartz, supra 
note 1 at p. 320 n. 22.
31 See Schlink, supra note 26 at p. 210-211.
32 For example, in Poland, by 1998 out of thirty-four judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, 




























































































academic circles of communist states, this fact has somehow not contaminated 
their reputation - perhaps due to a relatively high prestige enjoyed in Central 
Europe by academics generally. As for the judiciary, only few judges in the 
Communist era were directly involved in politically sensitive trials, and it would 
be correct to say that the bench was not held in disregard in most of the 
countries of the region — at least, compared to other public figures. It would be 
perhaps most realistic to say that the senior judiciary have been and remain 
relatively unknown figures (with few exceptions, such as a high-profile Chief 
Justice Valery Zorkin of the Russian Constitutional Court in years 1991-93), 
unburdened by any special liabilities related to their professional membership.
There is a broader reason for a relatively uncritical approach to 
constitutional courts within the post-communist world. While these courts (in 
any event, those operating in the most mature post-communist democratic 
systems) are essentially political institutions, engaged in a wide-ranging law- 
and policy-making, they can escape the social criticism endured by other 
political and legislative institutions thanks to their ability to draw upon the 
appearance of neutrality enjoyed by courts. The traditional paradigm of the 
judicial process is of a neutral umpire adjudicating between two parties and 
dispassionately dispensing justice. This description may fit contractual disputes 
but is a scarcely an apt description of courts seized on constitutional disputes. 
When engaged in abstract review, constitutional courts rather act as an 
additional legislative chamber which may, often on the basis of vague and 
eminently controversial constitutional pronouncements, strike down legislation 
enacted by another body, which is also committed to implementation of the 
same constitutional norms. (I will return to this point, at greater length, in Part II 
of this Working Paper). However, the paraphernalia of the judicial process -  
elaborate procedural requirements, the aura of reasoned debate, courtroom 
symbolism - create an air of majesty and dignity that other political institutions 
do not possess. The actual character of constitutional courts is substantially 
obscured by their very practices. The judicial costume lends an extra legitimacy 
and respectability to these institutions.
This is not to say that constitutional courts are indistinguishable from 
legislative bodies, but then, no two law-making bodies are identical either. In 
bicameral systems, the role of the second chamber is usually quite different 
from that of the “lower” one. For instance, in Poland, the role of the Sejm (the 
lower chamber of the Parliament) is significantly broader than that of the 
Senate.33 These infirmities of the Senate do not render it non-legislative, and if
exception to this general rule, Interview with Professor Todor Todorov, Justice of the 
Constitutional Court of Bulgaria, Sofia 11 May 2001.
33 It is only the Sejm that enacts statutes. The Senate can make amendments or reject the bill 
in its entirety but these decisions of the Senate can be overturned by the Sejm with an 
absolute majority. If the Senate does not express its views about a bill in the thirty days, the 




























































































in someone’s views they do, that would be an odd semantic convention. The 
same applies to Constitutional Courts. The fact that they operate under a 
number of restrictions to their law-making activity does not undermine per se 
their legislative character.
It is important to note, on the one hand, that there are important 
differences between these Courts and the paradigmatic judicial institutions, and 
on the other, that their part in lawmaking is informed by a number of constraints 
(differing from country to country) which do not apply to the parliament. For 
example, they operate under procedures which borrow greatly from courtroom 
procedure and symbolism in that they usually are not self-activated (but then, 
sometimes they are,34 and in a system in which a large number of important 
laws are brought before the constitutional court for review, the significance of 
that distinction between the court and the legislature is greatly diminished 
anyway).35 Further, they are more of a “negative” than “positive” legislator, to 
use a classical distinction by Hans Kelsen (but then, they sometimes issue 
affirmative pronouncements about the specific ways in which the defective laws 
have to be repaired, and in any event, the distinction between “positive” and 
“negative” is hard to draw).36 Finally, they are compelled to argue in ways 
which use the structure of legal syllogism meaning, in effect, that when they 
wish to invalidate a law of which they disapprove, they must argue that it is 
inconsistent with their understanding of the Constitution - either a specific 
provision, or a more nebulous “constitutional value”. Certain types of 
arguments in favor or against a given law which are available to the members of 
parliament (for example, about the degree of societal support for a proposed 
move) are normally not available to justices of the Constitutional Courts.
Much as these courts try to establish themselves (often, in good faith) as 
neutral interpreters of allegedly self-evident meaning of the constitution, 
commentators need not take these assurances at face value. The rejection of a 
judicial paradigm liberates commentators to ask questions about the legitimacy 
of constitutional courts’ role in lawmaking and in the displacement of the will 
expressed by other institutions, notably, the parliaments. It is not that, at the end 
of the day, legitimacy is to be doubted on a simple basis of a lack of electoral 
pedigree. But if the role of the constitutional courts is to be maintained or even 
enhanced, their legitimacy has to be argued for, rather than simply assumed.
The absence of such a reflection in the post-communist settings is all the 
more striking once one considers the debates in Western liberal democracies 
about the limits and justifications of judicial constitutional review. The gap is
34 Constitutional Courts in Hungary and Poland (though only in exceptional circumstances) 
can act on their own initiative.
35 See, similarly, Michel Troper, “Le bon usage des spectres: Du gouvernement des juges au 
gouvernement par les juges” (2000, unpublished manuscript on file with the author) at pp. 17-
18.




























































































puzzling. An institution has been straightforwardly imported into post­
communist systems from the West but the ideological and theoretical 
controversy surrounding that institution has not. If there has been a degree of 
angst caused by activities of the constitutional courts in the countries which 
served as models to new democracies, then there is no reason to refuse to ask 
similar questions with respect to their progeny.
To be sure, the longest and the deepest habit of challenging active 
constitutional review has developed in the country which influenced the 
establishment and development of Constitutional Courts in CEE to a very 
modest degree, namely, the United States. A tradition of doctrinal and judicial 
warnings about the dangers of enthusiastic judicial lawmaking has been 
famously punctuated by, among other things, James Thayer’s influential essay 
of 1893 calling for judicial restraint in the name of the goal of self-government, 
Alexander Bickel’s celebration of “passive virtues” that the Court displays in 
avoiding the excessive exercise of its reviewing powers, John Hart Ely’s 
defense of judicial review only insofar as it remedies political malfunctions of 
representative democracy, and -  most recently -  Cass Sunstein’s plea for 
“judicial minimalism".37 The very title of a recent book by Mark Tushnet -  
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts38 -  expresses well the strength of 
a doctrinal challenge to the principle of judicial supremacy and finality of 
judicial articulation of constitutional norms. Tushnet calls for a “populist” 
constitutional law in which the courts (including the Supreme Court of the 
United States) will not occupy any privileged position -  vis-à-vis political 
branches - in authoritative pronouncements about the meaning of the 
Constitutional provisions.
It is not only the commentators but also the judges themselves who have 
long been reminding themselves of the requirements for proper deference to 
democratically elected bodies, and for recognizing the presumption of 
constitutionality of statutes. Even if these reminders have often been only 
rhetorical, and if they served often as a disguise for activism, the very fact that 
the Supreme Court’s justices have felt a need to justify themselves in that way is 
significant. But often the argument about the proper respective roles of the 
legislature and the Court served as a justifying reason for refusing to invalidate 
the legislation, as, for instance, in the decision refusing to invalidate legislation 
prohibiting doctor-assisted suicide, the Supreme Court declared: “By extending 
constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great 
extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.
37 James B. Thayer, “The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law”, Harvard Law Review 1 (1893) pp. 129-56; Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous 
Branch (New Haven: Yale University Press 1962); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1980); Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial 
Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1999).




























































































We must therefore ‘exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break 
new ground in this field’.. ,.”.39
A similarly skeptical attitude towards activist judicial review has been 
articulated by many observers of the Canadian Supreme Court after 
thoroughgoing, rights based review was instituted there with the entrenchment 
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. As one legal scholar notes: 
“Over the two decades that judges have given concrete meaning to abstract 
rights, celebration of constitutional rights has turned to scepticism and the 
institutional legitimacy of the courts has been threatened”.40 This, one should 
emphasize, is not the only attitude to the rights review that is registered in 
academic or political circles in Canada, and it should be also noted that the 
public prestige of the Supreme Court among the Canadian population is very 
high. Still, interestingly, a 1999 survey showed that the Canadians were divided 
evenly on the proposition that “the right of the Supreme Court to decide certain 
controversial issues should be reduced”.41 The issue of the institutional 
competence of the Court, and its legitimacy to strike down laws adopted by the 
state and federal parliaments is certainly on the agenda in Canada. Its sharpness 
is perhaps somewhat weakened by (theoretical at least) availability of the 
“notwithstanding” clause of the Charter which allows the parliaments to enact a 
particular measure, notwithstanding its possible inconsistency with the Charter 
rights. The clause, however, has been rather conspicuous by its non-use (with a 
few exceptions, relating mainly to the special issue of Quebec), and it has not 
been generally a great success in the academic writings or in the community at 
large as an example of a compromise between parliamentary supremacy and 
judicial review.42
In contrast to the Supreme Court of the United States (and, mutatis 
mutandis, the highest appellate courts of Canada and Australia), European 
constitutional adjudication has not developed a tradition of self-doubt, 
agonizing, and “exercising the utmost care” whenever “breaking new ground” 
in constitutional matters. This may be due to a number of factors. For one thing, 
there is a much stronger tradition and habit of deference to the highest bodies of 
government (and this includes the judicial branch) in Western Europe than in 
the United States. More importantly, constitutional adjudication, in an abstract
39 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702. 720 (1997) (quoting Collins v. Harher Heights, 
503 U.S. 115, 125(1992)).
40 Judy Fudge, ‘The Canadian Charter of Rights: Recognition, Redistribution and the 
Imperialism of the Courts”, conference paper presented at the workshop “Sceptical 
Approaches to Entrenched Human Rights”, King’s College, London, 23 September 2000, at 
p. 1, reference omitted (manuscript on file with the author).
41 Id. at p. 2.
42 One commentator even suggests that, except for the French-speaking majority in Quebec, 
the notwithstanding clause “has now . . . generally assumed the mantle of being 
constitutionally illegitimate”, Janet L. Hiebert, Limiting Rights (Montreal: McGill-Queens 




























































































form, has been introduced explicitly in the Constitutions, rather than implicitly 
and only by the doctrine developed by the court itself, as was the case of the 
United States.43 Continental constitutional courts do not, therefore, feel any 
special reasons for anxiety about its legitimacy when deciding about the 
constitutionality of statutes. The general constitutional design of these 
institutions locates them in a special position, not comparable to that of ordinary 
courts. An American observer is right to note that “German, French, and other 
continental constitutional tribunals have neither hesitated nor apologized when 
issuing wide-ranging decisions on basic constitutional issues, often drawing on 
unwritten or historical principles and values”.44
But one should not overstate that point. While the strength and the vigour 
of criticism of constitutional courts is nowhere near as formidable in Western 
Europe as in the United States, it is not quite absent. The critique by Schlink, 
referred to above, is one example.45 Similarly, consider France46 where the 
tradition of warning against “le gouvernement des juges” well precedes the 
establishment of the Conseil constitutionnel and goes back to a 1921 book by 
Edouard Lambert who addressed his criticism to the US Supreme Court’s role.47 
More recently, Bernard Chantebout concluded that the power of constitutional 
interpretation is by its very nature political, and that “it raises a problem of the 
compatibility of constitutional review with democracy”.48 Earlier, in an
13 This contrast is not as sharp as this sentence suggests, regarding, for instance, France, 
where the dramatic extension of the authority of the Constitutional Council was a result of 
decisions of the Council itself rather than of a prior constitutional design. In a watershed 
decision of 1971, the Council “incorporated” the set of unwritten principles into a 
constitutional package (known by the doctrine as le bloc de constitutionnalité on the basis of 
which the constitutional review of laws is conducted). The Council did it by announcing its 
reliance on. among other things, “les principes fondamentaux reconnus par le lois de la 
République" (P.F.R.L.R.) [Fundamental Principles of the Laws of the Republic] even though 
the P.F.R.L.R. were not even mentioned by the Constitution in force (of 1958) at the time, 
much less specified However, the Council gave legal weight to the (unenumerated) PFRLR 
because they were mentioned in the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution which, in turn, was 
mentioned by the Preamble to the 1958 Constitution. These principles, the value of which 
was found to be equal to those of the Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789, were 
said to be discernible (by the Council itself, naturally) in the legislation in place up to the fall 
of the republican system in France, i.e. up to July 1948. See Georges Burdeau, Francis 
Hamon & Michel Troper, Droit constitutionnel, vol. 26 (Paris: L.G.D.J. 1999) at pp. 714-15.
44 H. Schwartz, supra note 19 at p. 165, footnote omitted.
45 See text accompanying footnotes 26-27.
46 I am grateful to Michel Troper for his information and opinion about the French tradition 
of concern about “le gouvernement des juges ”,
47 Edouard Lambert, Le gouvernement des juges et la lutte contre la législation sociale aux 
Etats-Unis; l'expérience américaine du contrôle judiciaire de la constitutionalité des lois 
(Paris: Giard 1921).
48 Bernard Chantebout, Droit constitutionnel et science politique (Paris: A Colin 1997), at p. 
60, quoted by Troper, supra note 35 at p. 8 [The translation of this, and the following, 




























































































impassioned article, René de Lacharrière argued that review of constitutionality 
has no constitutional basis in France, and went on to say, with sarcasm, of the 
concept of “le gouvernement des juges” that
[i]t is in reality neither a government nor the judges but something 
much better: a supreme censure which, without giving any 
traditional guarantees provided by a high jurisdiction, and while 
usurping the powers which are not allocated to it by constitutional 
texts or even are explicitly denied, dominates from now our entire 
political edifice.49
He also laments that the “enterprise of the Conseil constitutionnel” 
provides an extreme illustration of a “divorce that occurred between the French 
people and their politics” and that the only remedy is to “reintroduce . . .  a little 
more of real democracy to our institutions”.50
But is it legitimate to draw an analogy between the Constitutional Courts 
in transitional states and those in more “developed” and “mature” systems, and 
to replicate the arguments about the proper judicial role forged in those more 
mature systems? It is sometimes claimed that such an extrapolation is 
unjustified and that the relevant differences between the states which have only 
just emerged from authoritarianism and those in established democracies should 
lead us to suspend criticisms of strong judicial review which would otherwise 
be justified in the West. A careful student of post-communist legal 
transformation, Ruti Teitel, suggests that the usual doubts about the legitimacy 
of judicial lawmaking simply do not apply to transitional legal environment: 
“Our ordinary intuitions about the nature and role of adjudication relate to 
presumptions about the relative competence and capacities of judiciaries and 
legislatures in ordinary times that simply do not hold in unstable periods. ... In 
periods of political change, the very concerns for legitimacy and democracy that 
ordinarily constrain activist adjudication may well support such adjudication as 
an alternative to more politicized uses of the law”.51
In contrast to Teitel, I believe that there are good reasons to resist 
reliance on exceptionalism of transitional states as a means to suspend the 
objections which we might have elsewhere to the institutional anomalies. As the 
post-communist states of CEE become more mature and stable, so the 
objections against judicial lawmaking which are pertinent elsewhere in the 
democratic world apply with equal force to CEE. In particular, there is little or 
no reason to suspend “our ordinary intuitions” about democracy and legitimacy 
with respect to countries such as Hungary, Poland or Slovenia, the very
49 René de Lacharrière, “Opinion dissidente”, Pouvoir 13 (1980), pp. 132-150, at p. 139.
50 Id., at p. 150.
51 Ruti Teitel, ‘Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation”, 




























































































countries where the constitutional courts are particularly activist. In many 
relevant respects these states fully resemble mature democracies, exhibiting as 
they do developed and pluralistic party systems, free and diverse press, well- 
educated and politically aware electorates and independent judiciaries etc.
Moreover, there would be a certain irony in the use of exceptionalism to 
defend the role of the activist constitutional courts since some of the most 
activist courts themselves actually refer to the “normalcy” of the democratic 
systems in which they operate to justify some of their most activist decisions. 
The rhetoric of transition and extraordinariness is actually strongly resisted by 
the constitutional courts themselves. In an important decision of December 
1994 declaring the “lustration” law (vetting of political figures) unconstitutional 
on various grounds, the Hungarian Constitutional Court relied partly on an 
argument that a successful transition to a democratic system has actually 
occurred without a need to change the personnel through a lustration; the upshot 
was that the alleged purpose of the challenged law (namely, to secure a 
successful transition) could not apply. The principles to be applied to assess the 
lustration provisions had therefore to be those applicable to a democratic state 
based on a principle of rule of law. The Court drew a clear contrast between the 
past and the present, separated as they are by “the transition as a historical 
fact”.52 It made clear that the lawfulness of the “lustration” laws should be 
judged not by reference to unusual circumstances of transition but rather by 
appeal to balancing of the rights and interests at issue.
If anything, some of the Courts in CEE use (at least rhetorically) the 
argument from transitionalism to strengthen the idea of deference to legislatures 
rather than for the purpose of self-reinforcement. The Constitutional Tribunal of 
Poland, when emphasising that it conducts the control of legality and not of 
wisdom of the statutes, has been asserting that the legislator should have a broad 
discretion in deciding about the measures to adopt in order to fit the announced 
purposes. This principle, the Court has been occasionally saying, is particularly 
important in the periods of major systemic transformations, since transition 
“from the authoritarian state to the state of law may exceptionally take forms 
which would be unjustified under normal conditions”.53 Of course it remains to 
be seen whether the Court practised what it preached, and whether a distinction 
between legality and substantial wisdom of the law can be drawn. If the legality 
is a matter of conformity with broadly formulated, value-laden constitutional 
pronouncements, such line is not only difficult to draw in practice but, more 
fundamentally, chimerical as a matter of general principle. But the point is that 
the Constitutional Courts themselves either resist the rhetoric of exceptionalism, 
or, when they use it, apply it to opposite purposes to those of Teitel.
52 Decision no. 60/1994 of 24 December 1994, reprinted in Solyom & Brunner, supra note 2 
at p. 312.




























































































Apart from anything else, exceptionalist arguments resonate with the attitude 
that Central and Eastern European societies are as yet too immature for 
democracy.54 As an example of such arguably patronizing attitudes, consider the 
views of John Gray who believes that democratic institutions are not well suited 
to post-communist societies, and that -  at least to many of them, including 
Russia -  “authoritarian political institutions, buttressed by indigenous cultural 
traditions, seem to offer the best matrix for the emergent civil society”.55 Gray’s 
prescription is largely based on his diagnosis that a decisive role in shaping the 
political life in these societies is played by pre-Communist traditions which are 
“hardly those of Western liberal democracy”.56 But there are three problems 
with his prescription of “authoritarianism plus free markets”, based on that 
particular diagnosis. First, at least some of these societies had a pre-Communist 
past not less democratic than pre-World War II systems of many Western 
European societies which now have unimpeachable democratic credentials. 
Second, the democratic aspirations of peoples in countries of the region have 
been greatly influenced by the universal rise of democratic beliefs in recent 
decades -  so that the explanatory power of the pre-Communist past has now a 
very limited application. Third, the prescription of authoritarianism may be a 
self-fulfilling prophecy if the policies of the West are shaped by it. This would 
be a truly regrettable effect of Gray’s prescription.
As an aside, we may note that the exceptionalism of post-communist 
states has been used also for an opposite purpose to that mentioned above - not 
to mitigate our common misgivings about strong judicial role but to amplify 
them. Writing about Hungarian constitutionalism, Andrew Arato remarks: 
“[Jjudicial review does raise problems from the point of view of democratic 
legitimacy in a normally functioning liberal democracy. These problems, 
moreover, are inevitably exacerbated by the unavoidable activism in the context 
defined by the weak democratic legitimacy of the constitutional document”.57 
But this point has a very limited application. Hungary provides the only 
example of a post-communist state having a constitution adopted by a non- 
democratically elected parliament.
54 I should emphasize that I am not attributing such an attitude to Ruti Teitel.
55 John Gray, “From Post-Communism to Civil Society: The Reemergence of History' and the 
Decline of the Western Model”, Social Philosophy and Policy (1993), pp. 26-50 at p. 46.
56 Id. at p. 27.
57 Andrew Arato, “Constitution and Continuity in the Eastern European Transitions: The 
Hungarian Case (part two)”, in Irena Grudzinska Gross (ed.), Constitutionalism & Politics 
(Bratislava: Slovak Committee of the European Cultural Foundation 1994), pp. 271-88 at p. 




























































































III. Constitutional courts between the judicial and the legislative branch
As suggested earlier, it is clear that the constitutional courts in the region 
discussed here enjoy a high level of social acceptance and recognition, despite 
occasional disagreements and criticisms of their particular decisions. They do 
not therefore have a problem of “legitimacy” in the sense of general public 
acceptance of their authority to do what they are doing -  including, to overturn 
statutes. Further, these courts do not have a problem of legitimacy in the formal 
and institutional sense of the term, which may be understood as compliance 
with the constitutionally recognized limits and working under constitutionally 
defined standards. They do not, as a matter of routine, exceed the powers 
granted to them by the respective constitutions, by the statutes on Constitutional 
Courts or by other relevant laws of their respective jurisdictions. Even if one 
disagrees, on merits, with this or that decision, one must be careful not to frame 
the criticism in terms of a charge that the court acted ultra vires. A charge that a 
court decides on the (allegedly improper) grounds of the political or moral 
preferences of its judges as opposed to the (allegedly proper) grounds of 
inconsistency with the Constitution is a statement which reflects, rather than 
stands outside of, the substantive disagreement as to the wisdom, or otherwise, 
of a particular decision. Whether the court’s decisions are genuinely based on 
constitutional principles rather than the judges’ own policies and moral values is 
in itself a controversial matter, and the level of this controversy is no different 
from the controversy of the wisdom (or otherwise) of any other political 
decisions.
And yet, from the mere fact that the Court remains intra vires and does 
not violate the formal, institutional rules of legitimacy of its decisions, it does 
not follow that the Court’s actions are unproblematic from the point of view of 
legitimacy in a broader, critical sense of the word. The question then becomes 
not: “Is the Court authorized to take this type of decisions” but rather “Should 
the Court be authorized to take them?”
The question of the democratic legitimacy of an institution is not 
exhausted by the fact that the institution acts within the constitutionally 
established limits and that the constitution itself has been enacted 
democratically. There is no contradiction in terms if one claims that a 
constitutionally established device is undemocratic.58 It is a commonplace that a 
democratic procedure for establishing an institution does not necessarily confer 
a democratic character on the institution itself. A democratically constituted 
constitutional convention, proceeding in a democratic manner may decide to 
establish a non-democratic, or imperfectly democratic, institution. The degree of 
democracy that the constitutional convention wishes to infuse into the
58 See Jeremy Waldron, “Precommitment and Disagreement”, in Larry Alexander, ed., 





























































































institutions that it is about to set in motion is in itself a matter of free choice if 
the convention is to be truly democratic.
Just as there is no necessary connection between a democratic procedure 
of setting up an institution and a democratic character of that institution, so 
there is no necessary connection between the undemocratic nature of an 
institution and its legitimacy (even in a broader, critical sense of the word). A 
central bank, a civil aviation authority, the army or a national opera company 
are not “democratic” institutions (not just in the sense of internal decision­
making process but, more importantly here, in that their specific acts, or 
sometimes even the entire strings of acts, do not track the actual distribution of 
social preferences) but this does not render them illegitimate. More relevantly 
for our purposes, ordinary courts are not, and are not meant to be, democratic 
institutions and yet, in itself, it does not affect adversely their legitimacy. The 
main source of their legitimacy, as Martin Shapiro famously argued in his 
classic study on courts, derives from the “triadic” model in which two persons 
decide to call upon a third, neutral umpire, in order to resolve their 
disagreement. Shapiro argued further that “the substitution of law and office for 
consent” which distinguishes courts par excellence from go-betweens, 
mediators and arbitrators, introduces an important tension between the social 
logic of a triad (which is a source of a legitimacy of the court) and the actual 
operations of the court.59 In particular, Shapiro argues that the courts’ 
involvement in public law, their exercise of social control and their lawmaking 
functions importantly weaken their triadic, legitimizing structure. And yet, it is 
Shapiro’s thesis that courts, as we know them, are not qualitatively different 
from more triadic institutions (such as mediators): they “are simply at one end 
of the spectrum rather than constituting an absolutely distinct entity.”60 The 
need to elicit some remnants of consent (revealed, for instance, by courts’ 
reluctance to decide in the absence of one of the parties), their frequent pursuit 
of a compromise, and many other mediating components in judging, render 
them just a species of a broader family of triadic institutions.
It is important not to overstate Shapiro’s point: much of his argument is 
devoted to showing that the traditional “prototype of courts” is not reflected in 
the actual operations of judicial bodies. And yet, it is important to retain his 
general conclusion that it is precisely the departure from the triadic structure 
that is a source of possible weaknesses of judicial legitimacy. “[Fjrom [the 
triad’s] overwhelming appeal to common sense stems the basic political 
legitimacy of courts everywhere,”61 asserts Shapiro, but “[c]ontemporary 
courts are involved in a permanent crisis because they have moved very far
5 Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago 1981), chapter 1.
60 Id., p. 8.




























































































along the routes of law and office from the basic consensual triad that provides 
their essential social logic.”62
This tension between courts’ claim to legitimacy and their non-triadic 
patterns of operation, is further magnified when the procedure abandons all 
pretenses to adjudication of conflicting interests between two parties, and 
focuses instead on an abstract scrutiny of a legal text. If the scrutiny is unrelated 
to any particular conflict between two parties, the “triadic” sources of 
legitimacy of courts disappear altogether. This is the predicament faced by those 
constitutional courts whose functions include abstract judicial review. One 
could perhaps try to argue that a remnant of the triadic structure is there: there is 
a complainant (usually, the outvoted parliamentary minority, or the President), a 
respondent (the representatives of the parliamentary majority, or of the 
government), and a neutral umpire: the Constitutional Court. But this analogy is 
not apposite. The “triad” which underpins the prototype of courts is not 
constituted by two parties disagreeing about what social norms should be 
properly enforced in law, and a third party who resolves their dispute, which is 
the situation of constitutional courts’ adjudication The conflict which is the stuff 
of a triadic judicial resolution revolves not around abstract ideas concerning 
rights but about the claim that one party’s interests have been violated by 
another, under the existing valid rules. A better analogy to the conflict which 
lies at the heart of abstract judicial review is to the disagreement between a 
majority and the opposition about what law or policy is best for the society, 
under general and indeterminate constitutional provisions. Indeed, this is 
precisely what is at stake in the discourse within the abstract constitutional 
review of legislation. And in this discourse, the Constitutional Court is unable to 
rely on the argument that all it is doing is applying the existing law because it is 
precisely the rightness (under general constitutional standards) of the new law 
which is the subject of the controversy. As Jurgen Habermas has observed, 
“[t]he legitimating reasons available from the constitution are given to the 
Constitutional Court in advance from the perspective of the application of law -  
and not from the perspective of a legislation that elaborates and develops the 
system of rights in the pursuit of policies.”63
While the court-based legitimacy seems hardly applicable to abstract 
review, one can think of different types of democratic legitimacy that might 
support courts’ authority to invalidate statutes. It is not unthinkable, and 
certainly not patently absurd, that a sort of “third chamber” (or a second 
chamber, in unicameral parliamentary systems) endowed with a task of taking 
another look at the bill, this time from a narrower point of view of constitutional 
values, can be given a justification based upon the general principles of 
democratic legitimacy. A combination of a long tenure, immunization from
62 Id., p. 8.
63 Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. William Rehg (Polity Press, 




























































































direct societal pressures and from temptations connecting with seeking re- 
election, on the one hand, with a degree of electoral pedigree (after all, judges 
of constitutional courts are appointed almost always by democratically 
answerable bodies), on the other, may be just the right mix to combine a good 
democratic mandate with the institutional incentives for a serious, principle- 
based review required from a “negative legislator”. If what worries us (as it 
should) is a matter of democratic mandate of a negative legislator, then this 
concern may be (partly, at least) met by the fact that members of constitutional 
courts are much more democratically appointed than ordinary judges. Indeed, 
one could make an argument that a constitutional court is an indirectly elected 
democratic (or near-democratic) “chamber of reflection”, the purpose of which 
is to reconsider the bill in a more dispassionate manner, removed one step 
further from specific political controversies. This immunization from the 
passions of the moment need not necessarily deprive the constitutional court’s 
task of its representative character: one may, for example, charge the court with 
the task of identifying (and giving effect to) whatever consensus can be found 
on a given issue (which has a bearing on constitutional interpretation) in the 
light of (rather than in isolation from) the actual, current moral and political 
views in the community. One can even appeal to Rawlsian idea of “overlapping 
consensus” as a proper device upon which a constitutional tribunal should base 
its representative function.1’4
It is not my claim that such an argument is compelling. As a matter of 
fact, I do not think it is. To see why not, consider this typical statement from a 
proponent of the idea of representative functions of the US Supreme Court: 
“Without surrendering its prerogatives of judgment or compromising its 
obligation to uphold constitutional values in the face of political opposition, the 
Court, in specifying the meaning of constitutional principles, must be 
accountable at least in part to manifestations of reasonable moral and political 
commitments displayed by the citizenry, both nationally and locally”.64 5 For one 
thing, there is an apparent possibility of tension between the obligations 
proclaimed in the first and in the second parts of the sentence. What if “citizens’ 
commitments” clash with “constitutional values” as understood by the justices?
Second, the proviso that the only commitments which the Court must 
respect are the “reasonable” ones opens the gate to a number of “filtering 
devices” which will transform the actual conventional morality into something 
hardly recognizable by the citizenry.66 Finally, an idea that the Court must be 
accountable to “commitments” rather than to the citizens themselves strikes me
64 For such a conception of role of the Supreme Court of the United States, see Richard H. 
Fallon, ‘The Supreme Court, 1996 Term -  Foreword: Implementing the Constitution”, 
Harvard Law Review 111 (1997): 54-152, pp. 144-145.
65 Id. at p. 145, footnotes omitted, emphasis in the original.
66 See, generally, Wojciech Sadurski, “Conventional Morality and Judicial Standards”, 




























































































as fanciful. Accountability presupposes a possibility of censuring the agent by 
the principal - how can “commitments” do it? And yet the choice of words is 
not incidental because, naturally, there is no way in which the justices of the US 
Supreme Court (or any other court, for that matter) can be “accountable” to the 
citizens in the ordinary sense of the word.
Furthermore, an “overlapping consensus”-based rationale would generate 
a number of more practical questions: if we need a “negative legislator” whose 
task would be to test the bill from the point of view of constitutional mandate, 
should it be composed exactly in the way that the actually-existing 
Constitutional Courts are composed? Why should its composition be limited to 
lawyers only -  after all, legal skills are not decisive (and not the only relevant 
ones) for articulating the specific meaning of broad, value-based constitutional 
pronouncements? (This had been recognized in the design of at least one 
constitutional court outside CEE, namely the French Conseil constitutionnel, the 
members of which do not have to have, and it actually happens that they do not 
have, any formal legal qualifications). These are important questions but will 
not be pursued here. The only point being made is that a construal of 
constitutional courts as part of an institutional system of law-making is not 
incoherent and does not seem to raise impossible problems in supplying their 
democratic legitimacy. Certainly, the prospect of finding legitimating arguments 
for abstract review in terms of traditional representative democracy seems to be 
more promising than in terms of judicial function.
The paradox is that the constitutional courts themselves, and their most 
fervent doctrinal supporters, usually strenuously resist the characterization of 
their position in the political system as a second or third legislative chamber, 
and construct their own self-perception as “courts”, albeit somewhat different 
than the “ordinary” courts. There has been a controversy among the 
constitutional lawyers of CEE as to whether Constitutional Courts should be 
classified as within the judiciary or as a sui generis bodies. Further, the actual 
location of the provisions on the Constitutional Court in the structure of the 
respective constitutions varies somewhat from country to country. For example, 
in Slovakia the Constitutional Court is regulated in that part of the Constitution 
devoted to “[t]he judicial power”67 and is characterized inter alia as “an 
independent judicial authority”.68 Similarly, the constitutional courts in Russia 
and in the Czech Republic are regulated in separate chapters while in Poland, 
the Constitutional Tribunal is regulated in the chapter generally entitled “Courts 
and Tribunals” but with its own subchapter. (But then, the Polish statute on the 
Constitutional Tribunal explicitly states, in its first article, that the Tribunal is a 
judicial body). By contrast, several other constitutions include provisions on 
constitutional courts in separate chapters or parts altogether, without including
67 Part 7 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.




























































































them in any broader subdivisions. For example, in Croatia the chapter on the 
Constitutional Court comes between chapters on “judicial power” and local 
administration, in Lithuania between the chapters on the Government and the 
Courts and in Hungary between the chapters on the President and the 
Ombudsman, etc. The approaches in these countries ranged between pigeon­
holing Constitutional Courts in the “judicial” branch (which seems to be the 
dominant practice)69 and characterizing it as a sui generis institution which is 
arguably an avoidance of a characterization. For instance, the author of a 
chapter in the fundamental treatise on Polish constitution who is a 
Constitutional Court judge himself, Professor Janusz Trzcinski concludes that 
“the functioning of the CT [Constitutional Tribunal], as determined by the 
Constitution and by the Law on the CT, does not fit the accepted classifications 
[of branches of government into legislative, executive and judicial].”70 To my 
knowledge, there have not been any strongly expressed views within the 
mainstream constitutional doctrine in the region (and certainly not by any of the 
Constitutional Courts concerned) that constitutional courts, when exercising 
abstract judicial review, belong to the legislative branch of the state.
The self-perception of those courts as part of the judiciary, broadly 
speaking, has been also endorsed by some friendly commentators from the 
outside of the region. Owen Fiss announced: “In the new democracies of the 
East . . .  the judiciary . . . .  must give life and force to the idea of a 
constitutional court . . . [to] convince their fellow citizens that law is distinct 
from politics, and that they are entitled to decide what the law is.”71 The 
characterization of constitutional courts qua courts is implicit in Ruti Teitel’s 
view that the power of overriding the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision by the 
Parliament in Poland (before the adoption of the 1997 Constitution) was a case 
of mixing judicial and legislative powers, and evidence that “the understanding 
of separation of powers is far from entrenched in the region.”72 The image is of 
a legislative body (the Parliament) intruding upon the functions of a judicial 
body (the Tribunal).
It may seem ironic that the doctrine which would offer perhaps the most 
promising path of legitimating the Courts in their exercise of abstract 
constitutional review is most decisively resisted by the Courts themselves, while 
the doctrine which is patently unsuited to provide such legitimacy is the one
69 See Zdzislaw Czeszejko-Sochacki, Leszek Garlicki & Janusz Trzcinski, Komentarz do 
Ustawy o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym (Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa 1999), p. 8 who 
state that, in Poland, the majority of authors consider the Constitutional Tribunal as belonging 
to the judicial branch.
70 Leszek Garlicki, ed., Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej: Komentarz (Wydawnictwo 
Sejmowe, Warszawa 1999), chapter 8, p. 10.
71 Owen Fiss, “Introductory Remarks, Symposium”, 19 Yale J. Int. L. 219 (1994).
72 Ruti Teitel, “Post-Communist Constitutionalism: A Transitional Perspective”, Columbia 




























































































most zealously defended by those Courts and their apologists. But the paradox, 
is of course, illusory. If one adopts a “third chamber” perspective on the 
exercise of abstract constitutional review, there is no justification whatsoever to 
stick to the current composition of the Courts consisting, as they are, of lawyers 
only. Decisions about death penalty, abortion, defamation of public officials, 
etc. may be dressed in a legal garb but they ultimately hinge upon fundamental 
value choices on making of which legal education has no bearing whatsoever. 
The fact that it is the Constitution rather than a non-textual moral or political 
theory which forms the direct basis for a scrutiny of a given law is no good 
reason to restrict the range of scrutinizers to lawyers. After all, what 
constitutional review in such cases is about is not the detection of a “true” legal 
meaning of such constitutional concepts as the right to life, privacy or freedom 
of speech but rather a decision about what cluster of values is preferable to 
others in the articulation of a vague constitutional formula with reference to a 
specific problem unaddressed in a determinate fashion by a constitutional text. 
It is precisely because the issue is a choice of a cluster of values rather than an 
exegesis of the legal concept that a representative task of the scrutinizers is 
being called for. But, at the same time, for that very same reason no necessary 
connection exists between legal qualifications of scrutinizers and the nature of 
scrutiny, and that is why the democratic legitimacy of Constitutional Courts, as 
they are constituted, is continually called into question.
And it will not do to attempt to legitimize the existing Constitutional 
Courts by pointing at less-then-perfect legitimacy of parliaments. “The 
conventional concern of the absence of democratic accountability posed by 
judicial lawmaking seems less apt in periods of political flux. In such periods, 
the transitional legislature frequently is not freely elected and, further, lacks the 
experience and legitimacy of the legislature operating in ordinary times.”73 Ruti 
Teitel makes this observation as a response to the charge of the lack of 
legitimacy of constitutional courts, in particular, in post-Communist transition. 
But the observation about the legislatures not being freely elected applies to 
some of the legislatures in the region only (for example, only to the post-Round 
Table election in Poland in June 1989): usually, only to the first term of 
legislatures after the transition. This observation has, therefore, now only 
historical value. In those countries where the freedom and fairness of election of 
legislatures is questionable (Belarus), the problem of “activist” Constitutional 
Courts does not arise in the first place. In turn, the most activist Constitutional 
Courts operate alongside the fully mature, freely elected legislatures. Their 
“experience” may be put in doubt (but so may be the experience of new 
constitutional courts) but the remark about their “lack of legitimacy” is question 
begging. Anyway, even if the legitimacy of the parliaments is less than perfect,




























































































surely the remedy is not to supplant part of their power by the bodies which 
have even less legitimacy to create law and determine policies.
IV. The question of judicial activism74
How “activist” are the most dynamic constitutional courts in CEE? Is the 
judicial activity of these courts significantly altering the preferences of the 
parliamentary majorities, and -  more importantly -  departing from the views of 
the constitution makers? Elsewhere (especially in the United States) a reliance 
on the “original intent” in the area of constitutional interpretation is largely -  
and deservedly -  in disrepute, but when the constitution is brand new and the 
constitution makers are still very much around, the hostility to the very idea of 
the original intent is less understandable. After all, it is the constitution which 
provides the basis of legitimacy of the constitutional courts’ decision making.
It is difficult to establish what the criteria of “judicial activism” should 
be, and the concept itself is suspect to many legal scholars, but we do not need 
to get embroiled in the controversy about the term. What is important is that the 
phenomenon which it is supposed to denote here is substantial and raises 
understandable concerns, namely, a substitution of the parliamentary majority’s 
view by the court’s majority view about the proper articulation of the meaning 
of a constitutional right when these two views collide. As a working test, 1 
suggest that an inquiry into “judicial activism” of constitutional courts involves 
two criteria: the importance of the laws invalidated under the rights provisions 
and the nature of the reasoning leading to such invalidation.
As far as the first criterion is concerned, the relative importance of a norm 
is admittedly in the eyes of beholder, and whether a rule which has been struck 
down is relatively significant or relatively trivial, is a matter which cannot be 
ascertained in a non-controversial fashion. When, for example, the Estonian 
Chamber of Constitutional Review struck down Tallin city regulations 
concerning the removal of illegally parked vehicles,75 some will probably say 
that this is a relatively trivial matter, in the broader scheme of things. Others 
will look at the decision more closely and, having ascertained that the 
conclusion has been reached under an interpretation of the right to private 
property, will conclude that it posits a fundamental and potentially far-reaching 
principle of demarcating individual autonomy and the state’s police power.
At the end of the day, what matters for the characterisation of the courts 
as “activist” is not so much a proportion of relatively “trivial” matters decided 
by these courts but rather the very fact that, even if very rarely, some truly
74 This part of my working paper roughly follows the argument put forward in Wojciech 
Sadurski, “Rights-Based Constitutional Review in Central and Eastern Europe”, in Tom 
Campbell, Keith Ewing & Adam Tomkins, eds, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2001, forthcoming).




























































































fundamental political choices on central public issues have been reversed by the 
Courts. And there is little reasonable disagreement that some of the Central 
European constitutional courts have, at least occasionally, displaced the 
parliament’s will on fundamental matters.
What follows is a rather random list of examples. The laws invalidated 
(or partly invalidated, but with significant effects on the original laws) included 
rights to abortion (Poland, Hungary), the death penalty (Hungary, Lithuania, 
Albania, Ukraine -  in all these countries the abolition of death penalty was a 
product of constitutional courts’ decisions), economic austerity measures of the 
government (Hungary), important aspects of taxation laws and tax provisions of 
the annual budgets (Poland), requirements for naturalisation (Slovenia), 
privatisation of public land (Slovenia), and restrictions of certain rights of same- 
sex couples (Hungary), etc. This is an admittedly chaotic and random list, but I 
believe that it suffices to convince a reader that at least in some of the Central 
European countries, constitutional courts have on occasion displaced the 
preferences of parliamentary majorities on fundamental matters.
The importance of the laws overturned is only one part of a test for 
“activism" of the constitutional courts. Another, equally essential factor, is the 
nature of the reasoning which led to invalidation decisions. After all, if the 
courts are constitutionally mandated to check the statutes for 
unconstitutionality, they may have no choice but to overturn the laws which, on 
their face, clash with constitutional provisions. But then, the consistency or 
otherwise of two legal provisions (one of which is in the constitution) is always 
a matter of interpretation, and people may disagree in good faith about an 
interpretation of any two provisions: the one which is subject to a constitutional 
challenge, and the one which is the basis for a possible invalidation decision.
Rather than getting embroiled in a theoretical discussion about what 
renders a judicial reasoning “activist” (and whether such a characterisation 
makes sense at all), I will give some examples of characteristic patterns of 
reasoning of constitutional courts of the region discussed here, and appeal to 
certain intuitive, commonsensical and relatively uncontroversial views about 
how these patterns are symptomatic of judicial restraint or judicial activism of 
the courts in question. I will, further, discuss in some detail two important 
decisions on the death penalty and on abortion, from Hungary and Poland 
respectively, to give the reader an insight into the patterns of judicial reasoning 
of the constitutional courts in these countries.
In all fairness, one should note that the rhetoric of judicial restraint is 
well present in the case law of constitutional courts -  and often the rhetoric is 
adhered to in the actual structure of argument. The courts, when engaging in 
judicial review, often emphasise the presumption of constitutionality of statutes. 
For example, Polish Constitutional Tribunal in a 1997 decision on collective 




























































































The burden of argument is on those who challenge the constitutionality of a law 
and unless they produce a specific and convincing legal argument to prove their 
points, the Constitutional Tribunal will recognise the laws under challenge as 
constitutional.76
In a similar fashion, the courts often acknowledge the wide scope of the 
legislator’s legitimate discretion . The Hungarian Constitutional Court in its 
1991 decision on abortion stated that “[w]here the law should draw the line 
between the unconstitutional extremes of total prohibition and unrestricted 
availability of abortions is for the legislature to decide”.77 The courts also like to 
declare that, within the domain of legislative discretion, it is a political rather 
than constitutional responsibility which controls the legislator.78 They also 
characterise their own role as, at best, a “negative legislator”, rather than 
positive one, repeating a well known Kelsenian formula for a constitutional 
court.79 Most of all, they never tire of reminding their audience that the grounds 
of their decisions are not “political” but “strictly constitutional”, implying that 
the judges political or moral preferences do not enter into the process of 
review.80
But there have been also some important decisions of the constitutional 
courts which are unmistakably “activist” -  in the sense that the court had an 
option of upholding the statute, within a recognised conventions of judicial 
reasoning, and yet decided to overturn it. If a set of recognised conventions of 
judicial reasoning makes it possible for the Court to uphold the law, but also 
makes it possible to overturn it, a tendency to choose the latter path may be seen 
as an indicium of “activism”. This happens when, for example, a Court grounds 
its decision in very abstract, general and vague constitutional notions, about the 
specific articulation of which reasonable people may disagree, even though it 
had an option of founding its decision on narrower and less ambiguous notions. 
“Human dignity” used as a sufficient basis for overturning specific statutes is a 
good example. The Hungarian Court appealed to this notion in different 
contexts. For example, in a 1990 decision the Court proscribed trade unions 
from representing employees without their consent, the Court relied on “human
76 Decision K. 19/96 of 24 February 1997, in Orzecznictwo Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego, Rok 
1997 [Case Law o f the Constitutional Tribunal, 1997] (Warszawa: C.H. Beck, 1998): 65-77, 
at 72.
77 Decision no. 64/1991 (XII 17) AB of 17 December 1991, East European Case Reporter of 
Constitutional Law 1 (1994) 27.
78 E.g. Decision of Polish Constitutional Tribunal no. K 22/95 in Orzecznictwo Trybunalu 
Konstytucyjnego, Rok 1996 [Case Law o f the Constitutional Tribunal, 1996], vol. 1 
(Warszawa: C.H. Beck, 1996): 106-21 at 120.
79 See Decision of Polish Constitutional Tribunal no. K 13/95 of 24 September 1996, in 
Orzecznictwo Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego, Rok 1996 [Case Law o f the Constitutional 
Tribunal, 1996], vol. 2 (Warszawa: C.H. Beck, 1996): 79-105 at 104.
80 E.g. Decision of Polish Constitutional Tribunal no. K 19/96 of 24 February 1997, supra 




























































































dignity” and established the following general principle: “When none of the ... 
named fundamental rights are applicable for a given state of affairs” then the 
“general personal right [to dignity] ... may be relied upon any time by the 
Constitutional Court”.81 This is all the more remarkable since, as one (friendly) 
commentator of the Court noted, rather than relying upon the right to dignity, 
the Court could have easily held that the constitutional clauses which 
specifically relate to the rights of unions “to safeguard and represent the interest 
of employees”, only authorise representation with consent.82
Arguably, the most telling example of a use of vague and ambiguous 
notions in the service of overturning a clear legislative and constitutional 
intention is provided by the same Court’s decision invalidating the death 
penalty.83 To reach this -  laudable, from the point of view of this author -  
result, the Hungarian Court had to face the problem that the Constitution, on the 
basis of which it allegedly acted, contained a stipulation that ”no one may be 
arbitrarily deprived of life and human dignity” (art. 54 (1)). While silent about 
the specific issue of death penalty, this provision clearly implied that a “non- 
arbitrary” deprivation of life was constitutionally permissible. A judge faced 
with this textual implication who is intent on striking down the death penalty as 
unconstitutional, can theoretically reach this result in one of two ways, neither 
of which is quite satisfactory. She may either (a) claim that death penalty is 
necessarily arbitrary and thus prohibited under art. 54 (1), or (b) find another 
constitutional provision which would constitute a basis for invalidating death 
penalty, and give precedence to that other provision over 54 (1). In the opinion 
for the majority, the latter path is taken. The Court relies on art. 8 (2) which 
proclaims that “rules on fundamental rights and obligations shall be determined 
by laws which, however, shall not impose any limitations on the essential 
contents of fundamental rights”, in connection with the right to life and dignity. 
The Court said that the death penalty necessarily reaches the “essential content” 
of the right to life, and so -  to the extent that art. 54 (1) may be read as 
permitting a non-arbitrary deprivation of life - it is superseded by art. 8 (2). But 
of course whether a non-arbitrary enforcement of death penalty violates an 
“essential” aspect of human right and dignity is a moral proposition about which 
reasonable people may -  and do -  disagree. The Court opted therefore for a 
controversial moral judgement over a more precise and narrow constitutional 
permission.
Interestingly, in his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Laszlo Solyom 
used both strategies and it is no wonder that applying both of them creates a 
clear impression of an overkill. As to strategy (a), he argues that capital
81 Quoted by Gabor Halmai, “Comment: The Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Hungary”, East European Case Reporter o f Constitutional Law 1 (1994) 116 at 116.
82 Id.





























































































punishment necessarily intrudes upon an “essential” area of life and dignity 
because they are “an absolute value” and form an “indivisible and 
unrestrainable right". But if this were true then any law affecting adversely life 
and dignity, even if marginally, would have to be invalidated!. As to strategy 
(b), he argues that capital punishment is necessarily “arbitrary”, not in any 
empirical, sociological sense (for example, because it fails achieve its purported 
aims) but rather “conceptually”. Apparently, “capital punishment is arbitrary 
not because it limits the essential content of the right to life but because the 
right to life and dignity -  due to their characteristics -  is from the outset 
unlimitable".84 This is a strange statement, and can hardly be read in any other 
way than as an expression of strong moral disapproval for death penalty. Such 
moral disapproval is plausible and resonates with many people’s feelings -  but 
as it happened, not with those of the majority of Hungarians, nor with the 
majority of the Hungarian MPs acting both in its law-making and constitution­
making mode. Why should their moral judgments, as expressed in legal 
practices, be replaced by that of the Court, is the true issue which should have 
been addressed in this decision, but wasn’t.
As another example, consider a momentous 1997 decision of the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal on abortion law.85 The Tribunal struck down as 
unconstitutional some liberal aspects of the then Polish abortion law, basically 
finding any abortion other than justified on strictly defined medical grounds 
(because of threat to mother’s health, or the genetic defects of the foetus) or 
resulting from rape, as contrary to the Constitution. The decision was all the 
more remarkable since it ran contrary not only to the then majority opinion of 
the legislators (the Parliament was dominated by the centre-left coalition at the 
time) but also to the clear implications of the constitutional text. At the time the 
decision was handed down, a so-called Little Constitution (an interim 
constitutional document, virtually free of constitutional rights) was in force, and 
it contained no reference to the “right to life”, much less a right to life from the 
moment of conception. More importantly, a new, fully-fledged Constitution had 
been already adopted, including being passed in a national referendum, and was 
about to enter into force as from October 1997.86 While formally speaking, the 
new Constitution was not binding on the judges of constitutional court, it 
provided a good insight into the views of the constitution-makers. The new 
Constitution did make a reference to a right to life yet importantly, demands to
84 Id. at 133 (Sólyom, P., concurring).
85 Decision no. K 26/96 of 28 May 1997, in Orzecznictwo Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego, Rok 
1997 [Case Law o f the Constitutional Tribunal, 1996], (Warszawa: C.H. Beck, 1998): 173- 
246. This decision was reprinted in East European Case Reporter o f Constitutional Law 6 
(1999): 38-129.
86 The new Constitution was adopted by the National Assembly on 2 April 1997, subjected to 
the constitutional referendum on 25 May 1997, promulgated by the President on 16 July 




























































































include the proviso “from the moment of conception” had been considered and 
explicitly rejected by the drafters. At the very least, constitutional judges knew 
that the constitution maker had chosen not to prohibit abortion.
Faced with these textual constraints, the Tribunal nevertheless proceeded 
to argue that the availability of abortion on grounds other than those of (1) the 
danger to the life or health of a pregnant woman, (2) genetic defects of the 
foetus, or (3) pregnancy being a consequence of rape, are contrary to the Little 
Constitution. In the absence of any reference to right to life in that interim 
document, the Tribunal decided to base its conclusion, somewhat improbably, 
on the interpretation of the concept of the democratic “state based on law”, or 
Rechtsstaat, proclaimed in the first article of the Constitution. The centrepiece 
of the reasoning of the majority (and one should add that the decision was 
accompanied by three strongly worded dissenting opinions) was that the 
Rechtsstaat presupposes a community of people, and that the essential attribute 
of individuals is their life which has to be constitutionally protected “at each 
stage of its development”.87 While the “value” of life is not subject to gradation 
as a function of different stages of its development, the intensity of the 
protection can be varied, depending on the conflict of this value with other 
constitutional values and interests, the Tribunal announced.
A connection between this principle and the line drawn between some 
kinds of abortion (such as abortion necessitated by the health of a pregnant 
woman, which are permissible) and other kinds (abortions because of “hard life 
conditions or difficult personal situation” of a pregnant woman) rests on a value 
judgment which cannot be inferred from the Constitution itself. The Court 
decided to ignore the ‘authentic interpretation’ of the meaning of the 
Constitution, provided by very recent process of drafting of a new Constitution, 
and established as law its own judgment on a very controversial matter. Many 
observers suggested that the decision was an a response to the pressures by the 
Catholic Church -  which was, at the time, strongly agitating to de-liberalise 
abortion regime in Poland, and that the decision might have been related to the 
impending visit of the Pope John Paul II in Poland.
Another symptom of activism of some of the Central European 
constitutional courts is their predilection for a “balancing jurisprudence”, 
especially of the least deferential kind, namely, of assessing whether the 
legislative measures are necessary to attain approved legislative purpose. As is 
known, the use of balancing, “is transforming constitutional discourse into a 
general discussion of the reasonableness of governmental conduct”, and is 
therefore the kind of reasoning which situates the court in a characteristically 
legislative mode.88 A 1997 decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court 
provides a good example. It concerned the proposed referendum on
87 Supra note 85 at 181.





























































































amendments to the law on re-privatisation of real property, mainly, agricultural 
lands and forests.89 The referendum, proposed by three parties which obtained 
over 50 thousand voters supporting it, was meant to water down the 
reprivatisation law of 1991 by (among other things) introducing a ceiling on the 
size of the lands returned to the former owners, and also by banning the return 
of the land “of feudal origins”. The Court, exercising its power of review of 
referendum questions, largely disarmed the referendum proponents. It struck 
down the central question, aimed at introducing the limit of 100 hectares of land 
or forests by refuting -  on allegedly empirical grounds -  the rationale provided 
by the proponents of the referendum, namely, that that the return of very large 
areas was not within the capacities of the state, and would hinder the return of 
smaller pieces of land. This is clearly a sort of judgment on the cost/benefit 
calculus which is characteristically a domain of the political branches, not the 
court. As to the prohibition of a return of the lands “of feudal origins”, the Court 
inserted its own proviso that this prohibition must not apply to the land owned 
by churches and other religious institutions. Contrary to the intentions of the 
authors of the referendum, the Constitutional Court argued that “it would not be 
constitutionally permissible to equate the nationalised property of the church 
and religious communities in view of their role as institutions of general benefit 
and their position in the Slovenian legal system, with the estates of feudal 
origin”.90 In other words, a preferential exemption for the churches has been 
carved out by the Constitutional Court on the grounds of a positive assessment 
of the social role of the church. This assessment by the Court pre-empted a 
judgment by the general public whether the prohibition of return of feudal 
property should apply also to religious institutions. This judgment was made by 
the Court within the pattern of strict scrutiny (not a concept used explicitly by 
the Court), namely, on the basis that the
proposed measures must be unavoidable in a democratic society, 
dictated by urgent public need [and that] the . . . measures . . . 
must, in compliance with the principle of proportionality, be 
appropriate and unavoidable in order to reach the legislator’s 
objectives....91
If the standard of scrutiny of a statutory regulation is whether the 
measures adopted by legislators (or, as the last case illustrates, the measures 
contemplated by referendum questions) are “unavoidable” and “necessary” to 
attain the approved goals, the pattern of reasoning of the judges becomes 
virtually the same as that of legislators. It also expresses a high degree of
89 Resolution U-I-121/97 of 23 May 1997, reprinted in East European Case Reporter of 
Constitutional Law 4 (1997):279-303.
90 Id. at 288, italics added.




























































































distrust to the legislature’s judgment, and reduces the likelihood of affirming the 
regulation. It is almost always possible to establish an availability of a different 
measure from the one adopted by the legislature, and if such a demonstration is 
sufficient to defeat the legislation, no trace of deference to the legislative 
judgment can be found in the Court’s approach.
V. Reasons for the adoption of the “continental European” model
To ask why the CEE countries have adopted, without exception, a 
“European” model of abstract judicial review, concentrated in a specialized 
constitutional-review body, may sound silly. After all, they are European 
countries, they do belong to a “continental” legal and constitutional tradition, 
and those same factors which determined the victory of the Kelsenian92 judicial 
review (as opposed to the US model) on the continent, arguably must have 
informed the emergence of this very type of courts in the Central and Eastern 
part of the continent, when the circumstances for democratic development 
finally became ripe.
At the end of the day, this may be the correct answer , and yet I do not 
think that the consideration of this question is superfluous. Asking the simplest 
and the most naive questions can sometimes be illuminating. I believe that this 
is the case here. For one thing, not all Western European countries have adopted 
any system of judicial constitutional review at all, and of those Western 
European countries that have adopted a Kelsenian model, at least one (Greece) 
came close to a dispersed, US-style model.93 As Allan-Randolph Brewer-Carias 
argued at length in his book, there is no necessary connection between the way 
constitutional review is designed (that is, whether it is centralized or diffuse) 
and the family of legal systems to which a given nation belongs (that is, whether 
it is a civil or common law system).94 Second, even in some of the most
92 “Kelsenian” is herein used as a short-hand to describe the Continental model of abstract 
and centralized review. I am however conscious that the model which emerged in Europe 
after the Second World War, in particular in Germany, but also in Italy, Spain, France etc, is 
not a purely “Kelsenian” model because it envisaged, among other things, a rights-based 
scrutiny of constitutionality of laws, and contains important elements of “positive” 
legislation. In both these respects, Hans Kelsen expressed the opposite views when he 
advocated the establishment of the constitutional court in Austria. See Stone Sweet, supra 
note 21 at pp. 34-38; Sergio Battole, “Concluding Remarks” in Giuseppe di Vergotini, ed.. 
Giustizia costituzionale e sviluppo democratico nei paesi dell’Europa Centro-Orientale (G. 
Giappichelli Editore: Torino, 2000) at p. 357.
93 Under the 1975 Constitution of Greece (art. 95), all courts have the power not to apply 
legal provisions which they consider to be contrary to the Constitution. A diffuse system 
exists also to a certain degree in Switzerland (although only Cantons’ laws, not the federal 
ones, can be judicially reviewed) and in Portugal.
94 Allan Randolho Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law (Cambridge, 




























































































emblematic systems of abstract and centralized review such as Spain, there have 
been proposals to establish a decentralized, American-style model, in which all 
courts would be authorized to review statutes under the constitutional rights 
claims.95 Third, we should be wary of explanatory determinism: after all, the 
emergence of the Kelsenian model in CEE may be under-determined by the 
factors usually referred to in this context. If this is the case (as I indeed believe 
with regard to a number of explanations discussed below), then the emergence 
of such a model may be seen to be a historical contingency, and a belief in a 
plausibility of an alternative scenario (in which the American-style model 
would have been chosen) may not be as absurd as it seems at first blush. And 
further, if that is the case, the usual explanations for the emergence of the 
current system may be better characterized as justifications for the maintenance 
of that particular system. They can therefore be seen more as legitimating the 
status quo than analyzing it dispassionately.
After all, the post-1989 constitutional and political scene in CEE was, 
partly at least, a laboratory in experimentation in which many of the decision­
makers could have thought that they were making a fresh start. Of course no 
start is ever fresh. But the post-1989 was a mixture of the embeddedness in the 
old traditions and experimentation with the new. There were many options on 
the menu, and the American-style solution on many constitutional arrangements 
was not out of the question. In addition, there was no shortage of American 
experts around, including constitutional experts, to provide advice and advocate 
the right solution. And it just happened that the solutions proffered by American 
constitutional experts were, most often, those corresponding to the liberal (in 
the American sense of the word) reading of the US constitutionalism -  which 
included activist, US-style judicial review. Some of those American liberals 
explicitly urged the new activist constitutional courts (in particular, the 
Hungarian Court) to abandon abstract review altogether and, hence, to follow 
the US path.96
If we reconsider the question of why the CEE countries adopted the 
centralized and abstract model of review, and if as a result of this 
reconsideration we conclude that the usual explanations fail to fully account for 
the choice of the model (hence, they “under-determine” the model), then we can 
gain two things. First, we can help re-open the debate about the merits of the US 
style review and its future prospects in the region. (This, of course, is relevant 
only if we find that the US model has some advantages over the centralized and 
abstract model; something that I cannot even begin to argue here).97 Second, we 
can debunk the usual explanations by showing that, to some degree (that is, to
95 See Stone Sweet, supra note 2 at pp. 120-21.
96 See Bruce Ackerman, The Future o f Liberal Revolution (Yale University Press, New 
Haven 1992), pp. 108-9.




























































































the degree that there is under-determination) , they are ex-post facto 
rationalizations, and hence must be seen as legitimating ideologies.
Let us dispense first with what are arguably the two weakest explanations 
of the phenomenon of constitutional courts in CEE. The first one appeals to the 
willingness of the countries of the region to match the expected criteria which 
would facilitate their admission to the European Union, and those criteria are 
said to include a “European” rather than the US style of judicial review. It has 
been also said that the EU, generally, expected the candidate countries to set up 
the system of constitutional courts which would have very strong position vis-à- 
vis legislatures: “[w]hile parliaments and presidents will predictably resist 
judicial interventions, they are painfully aware that highly visible confrontations 
with their domestic constitutional courts will gravely threaten prospects for 
early entry into the European Union, which is already looking for excuses to 
defer the heavy economic costs that admission of the East entails”.98
This is a sheer speculation, and improbable at that. I know of no evidence 
to suggest that the accession to the EU figured on constitution-makers’ minds 
when deciding about the system of constitutional review in CEE, and I do not 
know why it should. After all, the preparations to the accession to the EU, even 
in the cases of the countries long considered the most obvious candidates, began 
well after the establishment of constitutional courts. And, on the other hand, I 
know of no evidence that the EU made it a part of its set of criteria for candidate 
states that they establish a system of constitutional review with a strong position 
of the courts vis-à-vis the legislature. In the first important decision of the EU 
which can be seen as setting the conditions for membership by post-Communist 
European states, the European Council in Copenhagen in December 1993 
established that the candidate countries in order to be successful must display, 
among other things, “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” but no 
specific institutional forms of attaining these conditions have been established. 
Apart from everything else, it would be hypocritical for the EU to expect, much 
less demand, that constitutional courts be established: there are members of the 
EU whose democratic credentials are unimpeachable and who have no French- 
or German-style constitutional review.99
The second explanation which seems to me quite weak is that there is an 
correlation between the fact that a country has just emerged from a period of 
authoritarian rule and the fact that it has established a “Kelsenian” rather than 
the US-style model of constitutional review. One can see a certain logic in the 
question by Louis Favoreu: “How could an American system function in the
98 Bruce Ackerman, ‘The Rise of World Constitutionalism”, Virginia Law Review 83 (1997): 
771-797, pp. 776.
99 The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have no judicial constitutional review at all, 
while Denmark, Ireland, Greece and Sweden have adopted systems bearing resemblance to 




























































































Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain, or Portugal, with judges from the 
preceding period of dictatorship named to the courts? Adopting judicial review 
in these countries would require “purification” on a massive scale of a corps of 
magistrates, while one could immediately find a dozen or so constitutional 
judges with no prior culpability during those periods, capable of carrying out 
their duties without mental reservations”.100 The argument about a generalized 
distrust to the judiciary as the state emerges from a period of authoritarian rule, 
is then extrapolated upon the CEE post-Communist countries.101 And yet, the 
reality of post-Communist regimes defies a simple dichotomy noted by 
Favoreu. Neither were the judges of Constitutional Courts in the region quite 
“purified” of their old habits and ideologies, nor were the ordinary judges as 
hopelessly immersed mentally in the “preceding period of dictatorship” as to 
offer no likelihood that they will dispense justice in accordance with the new 
axiology of the law.
One must not protest too much. Ruti Teitel certainly has a point when she 
observes that “as new forums specially created in the transformation, [new 
constitutional courts’] very establishment defines a break from past political 
arrangements”.102 Indeed, a “concrete” system of review would most probably 
have to rely on the old judiciary and so the symbolic effect of novelty would be 
lost. But the explanatory power of this observation is limited. Even leaving 
aside the counter-examples of Poland and ex-Yugoslavia (where the 
establishment of constitutional courts was not coinciding with the 
transformation), there have been some “old” institutions (such as Presidency in 
Poland or Czech Republic) which quickly acquired a much more powerful 
symbolism as vehicles of transformative politics than the “new” constitutional 
courts. No doubt, Vaclav Havel or Lech Walesa were much more powerful 
symbols of the new, even though they occupied “old” offices, than the largely 
nameless and faceless judges of constitutional courts in Warsaw and in Prague.
Perhaps the most significant explanatory power lies with the attachment 
of lawyers and constitution-makers in the region to the traditional “European” 
(as opposed to the US) tradition of separation of powers in which the role of 
ordinary judges is strictly confined to the application as opposed to the making 
of law. The adoption of the Kelsenian system seemed to disturb this tripartite 
structure of government to a lesser extent than allowing all the regular courts to 
check the laws for their unconstitutionality in the course of ordinary 
adjudication. The point made about the Western European systems, that the 
Kelsenian model “could be easily attached to the parliamentary based
100 Louis Favoreu, “American and European Models of Constitutional Justice”, in David S. 
Clark, ed., Comparative and Private International Law: Essays in Honor o f John Henry 
Merryman on His Seventieth Birthday (Duncker u. Humblot, Berlin 1990), p. 110.
101 See, e.g., John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, “Deliberative Institutions” (unpublished 
manuscript 2000, on file with the author).




























































































architecture of the state”103 104applies to the CEE countries as well. This has been 
certainly a frequent argument within the doctrine of these countries: that to 
authorize regular judges to declare the laws unconstitutional would place them 
above the legislature and would be inconsistent with the tripartite division of
104powers.
These are plausible explanations, as far as the compatibility of any form 
of judicial review of constitutionality with “old constitutionalism”105 is 
concerned. But much the same reasons which are being produced against the 
US-style judicial review, in terms of traditional tripartite separation of powers, 
can be used to attack abstract and centralized judicial review, as long as it is 
judicial rather than kept within the legislative branch. All the more so, it applies 
to the concrete judicial review exercised by constitutional courts, alongside with 
their power of abstract review. If a single ordinary court can initiate a review of 
a statutory provision by (what is seen to be) a court, albeit a special type of 
court, what is left of the traditional European separation of powers, with the 
dogma of the sovereignty of parliaments and a linked dogma of courts being 
confined to applying, as opposed to making, the law?
Perhaps a more relevant point is the formal absence of a doctrine of 
“stare decisis” in the continental legal tradition. In the “decentralized” model of 
judicial review, such as in the US, a strong precedent doctrine provides for a 
degree of consistency within the overall judicial system. When all the courts 
have to follow the rationes decidendi of the Supreme Court, and of the relevant 
higher appellate courts in their respective jurisdiction, the dangers of 
arbitrariness, uncertainty and lack of uniformity are minimized. But when there 
is no stare decisis (so the argument goes), a concrete-decentralized model 
threatens the unity of a legal system, and one can envisage an unwieldy 
situation in which some courts could find a particular law unconstitutional while 
others might uphold it.
But the distinction is one of a degree rather than of kind, and it cannot 
make all that much difference. The decentralized system yields a degree of 
uncertainty and inconsistency, regardless of the stare decisis doctrine. In the 
United States, unless and until the Supreme Court has pronounced on a given 
issue (which, under a certoriari system and due to a control of the Court of its 
own agenda need not be the case on every contentious constitutional issue
103 Stone Sweet, supra note 21 at p. 37; see also Stephen M. Griffin, American 
Constitutionalism (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1996), p. 121.
104 See e.g. Andrzej Wasilewski, “Przedstawianie pytari prawnych Trybunalowi 
Konstytucyjnemu przez s^dy (art. 193 Konstytucji RP)”, Paristwo i Prawo vol. 54, no 8/1999, 
pp. 25-39, at p. 29; Anna M. Ludwikowska, Sqdownictwo konstytucyjne w Europie 
Srodkowo-Wschodniej w okresie przeksztalcen demokratycznych (TNOiK, Torun 1997), p. 
21 .
105 On “new constitutionalism” in Europe, contrasted to pre-World War II European 
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tackled by lower appellate courts), there may exist a situation .in which: the 
Courts of Appeals for different circuits will come up with different solutions tCK 
one and the same constitutional controversy.106 On the other hand,, it is simply 
not the case that in the continental European law a system of judiciar^éè^dent 
does not operate in fact. In that system, consistent decisions of the courts -  
especially, of highest courts -  are in practice treated as unquestionable sources 
of law. This is so even if the doctrine explicitly rejects the idea of a precedent as 
a binding source of law. Consider this exposition of the French approach by two 
leading French constitutional theorists: “The courts very rarely cite precedents 
and must not base their decisions on them, because the only legitimate source of 
law consists of statutes. On the contrary, if one looks at the material that is in 
fact used, one realizes that precedents are the most important. . . . Precedents, 
without being formally binding, may have force if created by a court superior to 
that where the case is pending. This simply reflects the hierarchical structure of 
the courts”.107 Similarly, in the CEE countries it has been long accepted that, for 
instance, judgments of the Supreme Courts have a role of binding precedents for 
all other courts, at least to the degree to which the written laws do not provide 
determinate solution to a particular controversy.108
The upshot is that neither the general “architecture” of the system of 
separation of powers, nor the significance (or otherwise) of the precedent, 
provide sufficiently strong relevant reasons for opting for a Kelsenian as 
opposed to the US-style model of constitutional review. It may be seen more as 
an excuse than a convincing justification. In this, the establishment of 
abstract/centralized review after the fall of Communism resembles the 
establishment of abstract/centralized review in Western Europe where, as Alec 
Stone notes “a majority of political élites remained hostile to sharing policy­
making authorities with judiciaries” and where the opponents of decentralized 
concrete review saw in such a scenario “the spectre of the dreaded ‘government
106 This is not merely a theoretical possibility. Consider the current status of affirmative 
action, one of the most contentious issues in American constitutionalism. In 1996 the Court 
of Appeals for 5th Circuit invalidated an affirmative action plan implemented by the 
University of Texas Law School and held that the use of race as a factor in university 
admissions was constitutionally proscribed, Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.1996). 
The other circuits follow the 1978 Supreme Court’s decision Regents o f University of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) which explicitly permitted certain forms of race- 
based preferences in admissions. The Hopwood court argued that it was not bound by Bakke 
precedent because Justice Powell’s opinion (for the Court) did not gamer a majority (in fact, 
the central part of Powell’s opinion, though not an opinion in its entirety, was joined by the 
majority of judges). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 
(1996). I am grateful to Robert Post for this suggestion.
107 Michel Troper & Christophe Grzegorczyk, “Precedent in France”, in D. Neil MacCormick 
& Robert S. Summers, Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study (Dartmouth: 
Aldershot, 1997), pp. 103-140 at pp. 112-13 and p. 117.
108 See, e.g., Lech Morawski & Marek Zirk-Sadowski, “Precedent in Poland”, in 
































































































of judges’”.109 It may well be that such fear also weighed on constitutional 
decision-makers’ minds in the CEE when they refused to consider the 
decentralized, US-style of constitutional review. But let us note a strange 
inconsistency between such an explanation and, on the other hand, another 
conventional reason given against the US-style judicial review in Europe, 
namely, about the low status, prestige and skills of continental judges as 
compared to the US. If indeed (as is largely the case) “the judiciaries of these 
new nations [sfc] have very little institutional capital”110 then the fear that these 
judiciaries will reach for the power amounting to a “government by judges” 
seems ill-founded. And perhaps Japan, which has a concrete/decentralized 
model within the context of a relatively low-status judiciary111 shows that the 
fear of “government by judges” once the decentralized model of constitutional 
review is instituted is unfounded. And it is clear, upon reflection, why. Because 
the decentralized review carries with itself a whole set of doctrines of judicial 
restraint which are simply inapplicable to abstract constitutional review.112
But (it may be claimed) the reason for the priority of abstract and 
centralized review and hostility towards the decentralized is deeper than that. 
The United States -  an emblematic case of decentralized/concrete review, has a 
tradition of free-market, anti-statist approach to law, officials and the state. In 
contrast, the CEE countries share with their Western continental counterparts a 
tradition of statist and centralized approach to the state in general, not just to the 
judiciary. The higher the role of the state in society and economy, the more 
tendency there is towards state-controlled review of constitutionality. Such an 
argument has been recently made by John C. Reitz who describes a close 
correlation between forms of review and the general approach to the role of the 
state.113 In the US, where a market-centred approach prevails, only concrete 
review is available, with some residual aspects of abstract review (but not 
capable of being initiated by political actors). At the other extreme of the 
spectrum, in the most statist-centrist tradition, France, only abstract review 
initiated by political actors is allowed. In the mixed systems (e.g. Germany), we 
have a combination of abstract review, concrete review and constitutional 
complaint.
There seems to be an undeniable logic in the asserted fit between abstract 
review and statism because various forms of concrete review (which normally
109 Stone Sweet, supra note 21 at p. 40.
110 Owen Fiss, “Introductory Remarks, Symposium”, 19 Yale J. Int. L. 219 (1994).
111 For a characterization of the Japanese system of constitutional review as “modeled very 
much after the American system of judicial review”, see Itsuo Sonobe, “Human Rights and 
Constitutional Review in Japan”, in David M. Beatty, ed., Human Rights and Judicial Review 
(Kluwer: Dordrecht, 1994), pp. 135-174, at p. 138.
112 I develop this argument in Sadurski, supra note 17.
113 John C. Reitz, “Political Economy and Abstract Review in Germany, France and the 
United States”, in Sally J. Kenney, William M. Reisinger & John C. Reitz, Constitutional 




























































































have to be initiated by the subjects not directly controlled by politicians, such as 
ombudsmen, the judiciary, or, in the case of constitutional complaint, by the 
individuals) implicate a partial loss of control by the state of the initiation of 
constitutional review. The correlation seems to be supported by the other 
European cases not considered by Reitz, namely by Italy and Spain, which, on 
the spectrum ranging from statism to market-centredness can be located half 
way between the US and France, and where the judiciary (in the case of Italy) 
and the judiciary or the Ombudsman or the individuals concerned (in the case of 
Spain) can initiate the process of concrete review. But is there really such a 
correlation? Was Italy of 1948 so much less statist-oriented than France of 1958 
as to account for the difference between the presence and the absence of 
concrete review? And similarly, was post-Franco Spain of 1978 as infused with 
non-statist, corporatist elements as Germany of early 1950’s that the presence of 
concrete review which can be initiated even by individuals can be explained by 
the role of the state?
Perhaps. I am unable to pursue such an analysis in the framework of this 
working paper. Only two observations are in order at this point. First, one 
should be careful not to take the very availability of concrete review as one 
possible symptom of the less statist approach to the role of the state (as public 
lawyers would probably tend to do) since the explanatory role of the state factor 
would be then nil. One and the same factor cannot at the same time be a result 
of and evidence for a proposed causal factor. Second, if the general approach to 
the role of the state is to explain the nature of judicial review in the CEE 
(something that Reitz is not doing) then we have a clear case of under­
determination there. After the transition, the question of the tasks of the state in 
the society (and towards economy in particular) has been and still is one of the 
most contentious, unresolved issues in CEE.
But a more interesting question is, whether such a “fit” is present also at a 
deeper level, as Reitz suggests that there is a connection between the 
fundamental values underlying the model of review and those behind the model 
of the state? According to Reitz, the principal value which supports abstract 
review is “legal certainty”. This is because an authoritative decision about the 
validity (constitutionality) of a new statute is taken even before (or soon after) 
the statute enters into force, and there is no period of uncertainty between the 
enactment and the review. In turn, such a period of uncertainty is necessarily 
produced by a form of review which is conditioned by a specific legal “case or 
controversy”. So much is probably uncontentious: legal certainty may be indeed 
higher in the system of abstract as opposed to concrete review. I say “probably” 
because, once the system allows concrete review alongside abstract review, as 
all the continental systems of judicial review do, with the exception of France, 
and as all the CEE systems of judicial review do, with the exception of Ukraine, 
the effect of legal certainty related to the abstract review is lost. Indeed, the 




























































































once the law is ratified, there is no possibility of ever declaring it 
unconstitutional (as is the case in France). But ex post abstract review 
introduces an element of uncertainty. This element is related not so much to the 
abstractness but rather to the fact that review may be initiated (never mind by 
whom) already after the law entered into operation. And this kind of uncertainty 
can well be minimized by a simple technique of establishing a legal deadline by 
which a new law can be challenged.114 If no such techniques are actually being 
used115 it may be for the reason that the uncertainty resulting from abstract, ex 
post review has never been perceived as a major problem.
But even conceding, for the sake of argument, that abstract and 
centralized review provides for a higher level of legal certainty than the 
concrete and diffuse one, does it follow, as Reitz claims,116 that abstract review 
is based on a degree of paternalism, while the US model of concrete review 
reflects strong anti-paternalistic stance of the American constitutional system? 
In Reitz’s words: “The kind of citizen required by a system limited to concrete 
review is a ‘tough’ citizen, one who is willing to run significant risks 
deliberately in order to vindicate his rights, not one who waits for the 
paternalistic arms of the state to take care of him”.117 We may accept arguendo 
that the general hostility to paternalism is higher in the American political 
culture than in Europe. It remains to be seen whether this higher American anti­
paternalism can indeed explain reliance on concrete review only and, a 
contrario, whether a relatively higher degree of acceptance of paternalism in 
Europe explains the European preference towards abstract review. Taking the 
argument one step at a time, it may be true that paternalism (government 
knowing what is good for its citizens better than citizens do themselves) is 
inconsistent with a high degree of legal uncertainty: a paternalist government 
would like to signal clearly to the citizens its expectations about their behavior. 
But the link between paternalism and high legal certainty (which yields, as we 
have seen, abstract but also in particular an ex ante or limited-in-time review) is
114 In contrast, such a deadline regarding a challenge initiated in the course of concrete review 
(but not constitutional complaint) that is, occasioned by a concrete litigation, would be 
clearly pernicious. A person has no control when she can be brought to court under a 
particular law which she can then claim unconstitutionally violates her rights!
115 As one example of such a time limit one might mention the rule in Poland until 1997 that 
abstract review of statutes applied only to statutes enacted no earlier than 5 years before the 
date of the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision (Article 24 of the Law of 29 April 1985 on 
Constitutional Tribunal). This limit has been abandoned by the new statute on Constitutional 
Tribunal, adopted 1 August 1997. One may hypothesize that one reason why this provision 
was dropped had to do with its very low practical relevance: in a system of predominantly 
abstract review, where the challenges to laws are most likely to be launched by the defeated 
parliamentary minority, it is highly unlikely that challenges will be made to laws which have 
been on the books for a very long toime.
116 Reitz, supra note 113 at pp. 80-81.




























































































contingent and indirect at best. After all, any government interested in guiding 
the behavior of its citizens by clear rules, paternalist or not, has an interest in 
providing a high degree of legal certainty to citizens. This legal certainty (and 
thus, the efficiency of authoritative rules) clashes at times with other values, 
such as flexibility or individual self-determination, but it is not clear why the 
“paternalistic” attribute of rules would add an extra weight to the legal certainty 
side of the calculus. While the anti-paternalist might applaud opening the path 
for individuals through concrete review, it is question-begging that she should 
fear maintaining the path for abstract review at the same time, and so it is 
doubtful whether “[Rejection of paternalism surely lies at the heart of . . . the 
US rules on justiciability”.118 The only reason why an anti-paternalist might 
disfavor abstract review would be that she would fear that the government (or 
any other official body endowed with the authority to initiate the review) could 
be tempted to exercise it in a paternalistic fashion, that is, on the basis of the 
alleged good of the citizens who might benefit from the success of the review, 
even despite the citizens’ views to the contrary. For paternalism, strictly 
speaking, occurs only when the authority displaces the actual citizens’ 
preferences while claiming that it is doing so for their own good. But such a 
depiction of the official motives behind the review strikes me as convoluted if 
not fanciful in most cases: in the emblematic examples of the exercises of 
review in the abstract-review-only situations, that is, in the famous decisions of 
the French Conseil constitutionnel, one would search in vain the cases which 
would fit such an account. And no wonder. When a French legislative minority 
successfully challenged the bills on media pluralism119 or on nationalization of 
enterprises120 they did not appeal to any paternalistic arguments but to their own 
political or ideological visions, different from those of the majority. This was a 
routine game of democratic politics, resolved by the Conseil in these cases in 
favor of the minority, but appeals to paternalism did not (nor did they need to) 
figure anywhere in the discourse. As a general speculation, it is hard to see why, 
as a rule, the initiators of abstract review would “become detached from the 
concerns of the individuals whose rights are immediately at stake” so at to risk a 
situation in which the citizens would be actually opposed to the goals 
underlying such an intervention.121
But perhaps there is another type of link between paternalism and abstract 
review: a fear that the exercise of constitutional review by individuals
118 Id., p. 81. See also Lea Brilmayer, ‘The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the 
‘Case or Controversy’ Requirement”, Harvard Law Review 93 (1979), pp. 297-321 at p. 313.
119 See Stone Sweet, supra note 21 at pp. 80-83
120 See id., pp. 66-8.
121 The words in quotation marks are from Lea Brilmayer, “A Reply”, Harvard Law Review 
93 (1980), pp. 1727-33, at p. 1732, and they apply not so much to an abstract review initiated 





























































































concerned would be unwise, immature, detrimental to themselves. Such fear 
would certainly have strong paternalist undertones, and one can understand 
why, when defending the projects of fundamental reform of constitutional 
review in France in the early 1990s, the then President of the Conseil 
constitutionnel Robert Badinter warned: “on ne peut traiter indéfiniment les 
citoyens en etérnels mineurs”.'22 The main point of the proposed reform (which 
failed to gain the support of the Senate) would be to endow each party to a legal 
process with a right to challenge the constitutionality of a statute (on the basis of 
an alleged violation of the party’s fundamental rights), provided the Conseil 
constitutionnel had not pronounced on the constitutionality of this law before. 
The attitude attributed (no doubt, with good reasons) to the opponents of the 
reform by President Badinter indeed smacks of paternalism.
However, once there exists in a given judicial system a path of concrete 
review (and, even more importantly, of constitutional complaint) available to 
individuals alongside the abstract review initiated by the political actors, the 
link between abstract review and paternalism disappears altogether. The French 
system can be therefore, perhaps, accused of (or only explained by reference to) 
the tradition of paternalism, but the German, Spanish, Italian etc. cannot. It is 
not that there is less paternalism in a mixed system which combines abstract and 
concrete review, rather that there is no link between paternalism and the 
constitutional model of review at all. So the possible link between the CEE 
model of review and a (putative) paternalistic tradition cannot be seriously 
upheld.
Perhaps a better explanation could be that concrete review is well suited 
to a narrow understanding of the role of the constitution (and, consequently, of 
the constitutional review), namely, when the constitution’s main purpose is seen 
as a safeguard of individual and minority rights against majoritarian oppression. 
This is very much a characteristically US model of constitutionalism. The 
tradition of seeing the protection of individuals against majoritarian oppression 
as one of the main purposes of the constitution has resulted in the well- 
established perspective on constitutional review seen as the last bastion of 
individual (and minority) rights against legislative intrusion. It is plausible that 
one who endorses this view of the constitution’s purpose and this perspective on 
constitutional review may have a clear preference for a concrete, as opposed to 
abstract, constitutional review. This is because if the whole point of the review 
is based in distrust towards political institutions, then it would be odd to endow 
those very institutions with the task of initiating such a review. When 
individuals feel that their rights are violated by the legislative majority, they can 
look after themselves and press their claims in the court leading, hopefully, to 
constitutional review -  so the argument goes. However, if we broaden our view 12
122 Robert Badinter, quoted in Jean Gicquel, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques, 




























































































about the proper realm of constitutionalism, and in particular if we incorporate 
socio-economic functions into the scope of the constitution (and, again, of 
constitutional review as a consequence), individual litigation is no longer an 
adequate mechanism to initiate constitutional review.123
This proposition could be plausibly defended on a number of grounds but 
the most obvious would be that the individual citizens do not ordinarily have 
(each taken individually) sufficient interests which would compel them to 
launch a constitutional litigation, or (what comes basically to the same thing), 
that their interest in winning such litigation is, at best, only indirect and remote. 
What is important is that constitutional court is now seen not only as a protector 
of individual and minority rights against legislative majority but, more 
fundamentally, as a guardian of the Constitution as a whole, including its 
separation-of-powers rules and socio-economic policy constitutional guidelines, 
when applicable. And in such a perspective it is only logical that the judicial 
review of legislative acts should be triggered by political actors in those cases 
when one would not normally rely on individual court suits.
This argument seems plausible, though one must not exaggerate the link 
between abstractness of review and the policy-oriented nature of the review. 
After all, in the constitutional systems which rely on concrete review only, such 
as the United States, Canada or Australia, much review has a policy-oriented 
aspect, not reducible directly to the protection of individual rights against 
majority. It is significant that in a famous article about the Supreme Court’s 
role, Robert Dahl had characterized the Court as a “national policy-maker” and 
showed that the dominant views on the Supreme Court have never been for long 
out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of 
the time.124 Under the relaxed rules of standing, not only individuals but also 
groups and associations can pick up various policy-based grievances and turn 
them into constitutional suits - in the US, they have standing to assert those 
interests of their members which are germane to the association’s purpose.125 
Even broader test of standing was adopted in Canada where all that “a plaintiff 
in a suit seeking a declaration that legislation is invalid” needs to show is that 
“he has a genuine interest as a citizen in the validity of the legislation.. ,.”.126 In 
India, another concrete-review country, the courts have been long used for
123 See Reitz, supra note 113 at pp. 81-84.
124 Robert A. Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker”, Journal o f Public Law 6 (1957): 279-295.
125 See. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), 
discussed by Brilmayer, supra note 118 at pp. 318-19. In this decision, the Supreme Court 
unanimously accepted the standing of a state governmental commission composed of 
representatives of the apple industry (and thus treated it as analogous to a voluntary 
association) to challenge the constitutionality of a statute regulating the packaging of apples. 
This is as clear a case as they have come to in using concrete review in order to change 
economic policy.




























































































public-interest legislation, and the standing to sue have been granted to any 
“member of the public having sufficient interest”, where “sufficient interest” 
encompasses a genuine concern for the rights of others.127 The concreteness of 
review does not seem to be such an impediment to policy-related complaints, 
after all.
But even if abstract review seems better suited to those exercises of 
review which are not directly related to a claim of a violation of individual 
right, this would only provide a partial explanation for the dominance of 
abstract review in CEE constitutional systems, for two reasons. First, even if 
one adopts a broader notion of constitutionalism, which encompasses a control 
by the constitution of large areas of policy-making, it still does not explain why 
one would want to involve a constitutional court into this control. Unless one 
equates the scope of constitution with the scope of justiciability, and believes 
that any constitutional violation should be reviewed by a constitutional court, 
the argument for abstract judicial review is question-begging. In other words, it 
is of course undeniable that abstract review does involve the court in the 
national policy-making to a much higher degree than concrete review. But it 
still does not follow that one should want to involve a court in the policy­
making. Second, the prevailing arguments in favour of establishing 
constitutional courts in that region were made precisely in terms of a protection 
of constitutional rights against legislative violations of those rights, that is, in 
terms which place themselves safely in the traditional, anti-majoritarian logic of 
a concrete review. This, to be sure, was not the only type of the argument in the 
constitutional discourse of these countries but it was a dominant one. The 
leading courts in the region liked to emphasize that they saw their main role as 
the protector of individual rights. As the then Chief Justice Solyom of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court declared, “We always stress that we are 
activists in certain areas, namely, concerning fundamental rights, where the 
Court does not hesitate to decide ‘hard cases’. But we are self-restrictive 
concerning the problems related to the political structure”.128 A commentator on 
the Hungarian Court could therefore accurately observe: “The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court has defined its own activity as that of the guardian of
human rights in the midst of a quasi-revolutionary transformation........ ”.129 And
this was by no means limited to the Hungarian court only.130
127 See Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1998).
p. 86.
28 Interview with Laszlo Solyom, East European Constitutional Review 6 (1) (1997): 71- 
77,p. 72.
129 Andrew Arato, “Constitution and Continuity in the Eastern European Transitions: The 
Hungarian Case (part two)”, in Irena Grudzinska Gross, ed.. Constitutionalism & Politics 
(Slovak Committee of the European Cultural Foundation, Bratislava 1993), p. 271.
130 A judge of the Russian Constitutional Court states that the goal of protecting and 
guaranteeing human rights is one of the three, equally important, tasks of the Russian Court, 




























































































That is why a general thesis by Martin Shapiro that the power of constitutional 
courts today derives from the fact that they are useful as arbitrators in division- 
of-powers disputes, so that they “keep the basic institutional processes 
running”,* 131 and consequently that the acceptance by these political actors of the 
rights adjudication as a necessary cost of having this instrument in place, does 
not apply easily to the phenomenon of the CEE constitutional courts. As the 
above quoted declaration of Justice Solyom, among others, suggests, it is not 
the case that the main declared aim of setting up the constitutional court was to 
supply an umpire in division-of-powers disputes rather than to articulate rights. 
Neither is it the case that, in CEE, rights adjudication came later in time than the 
division-of-power adjudication, the trend that Martin Shapiro discerns with 
regard to other constitutional courts in the world. On the other hand, the fact 
that these courts tend to be more deferential to legislatures on separation-of- 
powers issues than on rights issues132 seems to confirm a hypothesis that, in 
order to gain a necessary capital allowing the Court to be activist on rights, it 
must “shore up its party political and popular support”133 by deferring to 
politicians on other issues which may affect the politicians’ vested interests 
much more directly, namely on their powers and procedures available to 
them.134
VI. The question of finality of decisions
In the post-communist world, only the Romanian tribunal has a less-than- 
frnal power of review, in the sense that its decisions about unconstitutionality 
can be overridden by a parliamentary supermajority (also in Poland it was the 
case under the regime of so-called Little Constitution, now superseded by a new 
fully-fledged Constitution of April 1997). This is considered a sign of its 
institutional disadvantage,135 and as inconsistent with the very principle of the 
rule of law.136 But for those who deplore the anti-democratic consequences of 
judicial power, the non-finality offers a way of reconciling democratic decision­
making with constitutional review. The power of constitutional tribunals to
highest bodies of the Russian state, Interview with Boris Ebzeev, East European 
Constitutional Review 6 (1) (1997):83- 88, p. 86.
131 Martin Shapiro, supra note 25 at p. 205
132 See Arato, supra note 129 at pp. 272-3.
133 Zifcak, supra note 12 at p. 27.
134 See, similarly, Osiatynski, supra note 11 at p. 151, n. 185.
135 See, e.g interview with Andrzej Zoll, the then Chief Justice of the Polish Constitutional 
Court, in EECR 6 (1) (1997) 77-78 at 78: ‘The main problem is the ability of the Sejm to 
overrule Tribunal decisions....”. Elsewhere, Professor Zoll argued that the retention of the 
parliament’s power to override the Tribunal’s decisions after the changes of 1989 was a 
remnant of a totalitarian system.





























































































review acts, but only tentatively, means that legislators — and the general public 
— are asked to have a second look at proposed legislation, and consider the 
constitutional aspects which perhaps had not been considered sufficiently in the 
first approach. It is the power that slows, but does not derail, the operation of 
majority rule.
But even if we put to one side the possibility of parliamentary override, 
the power of constitutional review should not be seen as a matter of a 
dichotomy -  either the constitutional tribunal’s decisions are final, or they are 
only tentative -  but rather as part of a continuum. At one end of the spectrum, 
the tribunal’s decision adds only an insignificant cost to the legislative process 
and the will of the legislators is subverted only to a minimal degree; at the other 
end of the spectrum, the cost of overriding the non-majoritarian body is very 
high. But the court’s decision is never “final” in the literal sense; in lawmaking, 
there is no such thing as having “the last word.” For one thing, it can always be 
overridden by constitutional amendment. The degree of “finality” of 
constitutional court decisions may be then measured by the degree of 
entrenchment of the constitution: the easier it is to amend the constitution, the 
less final are the constitutional court decisions. More often than not, 
constitutional amendment is a costly and burdensome affair, and the examples 
of amendments introduced specifically to override constitutional court decisions 
are very few and far between. As far as Western Europe is concerned, Alec 
Stone Sweet identified only one case of constitutional overturning of the Court 
Court decision in the four countries he studied (Germany, France, Spain and 
Italy), namely in France in 1993, when the right-wing majority in the Assembly 
and the Senate revised the Constitution in order to permit the promulgation of a 
controversial immigration and asylum law (which had been earlier annulled by 
the Conseil constitutionnel).nl In CEE, I know of only one example of 
overriding the constitutional court by const, amendment: in Hungary in 1990 the 
Constitutional Court found unconstitutional the absence of a right to vote in 
general elections by Hungarian citizens abroad, and referred the law to the 
Parliament demanding a correction. As a consequence, the National Assembly 
adopted a constitutional amendment which explicitly deprives those persons of 
a right to vote.137 38
Constitutional amendments may be costly and burdensome, but not 
necessarily much more costly than the supermajority needed to override 
(through a non-constitutional procedure) a tribunal’s decision in, for example, 
Poland until 1997 and Romania. As a matter of fact, in Poland until 1997 the 
requirements for a constitutional amendment were exactly the same as those for 
a decision overriding the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision, and this fact served
137 Stone, supra note 21 at 89.
138 Art. 70.1 of the Constitution of Hungary, see Anna M. Ludwikowska, Sadownictwo 
konstytucyjne w Europie Srodkowo-Wschodniej w okresie przeksztalcen demokratycznych 




























































































as the basis for one commentator’s remark that “the override [was] tantamount 
to [a constitutional] amendment.”139 In Romania, the difference is that, while 
both the override and the constitutional amendment require the same 
parliamentary majority, the amendment also requires a referendum.140
It should be noted that in Romania -  the only CEE country where 
decisions of the Constitutional Court about unconstitutionality of statutes can be 
overridden by the parliament -  the views about this institutional arrangements 
are divided though it would be probably accurate to say that the majority of law 
yers and commentators consider this possibility as aberration. In Romania, the 
prevailing opinion among lawyers and other observers of the Constitutional 
Court seems to be critical of the parliamentary override, on the basis that it 
weakens the authority of the Constitution. As one observer notes, the 
availability of an override is “a mistake” and the “Constitutional Court should 
control all the constitutional affairs”.141 The same observer believes that the 
only reason why the parliament never has actually overridden any Court’s 
decision of invalidation is that the Court never has actually struck down “any 
really important laws”.142 An eminent constitutional lawyer, and an ex-judge of 
the Constitutional Court himself, Professor Mihai Constantinescu opines that 
“this is not a good solution” and as a result, the Constitutional Court’s decisions 
are not really “decisions” but only “suspensive vetoes”.143 At the same time, he 
admits that the override is a “largely theoretical possibility” because of an 
extremely high requirement of 2/3 in both chambers.144 That is why, as he says, 
the possibility of override never really concerned him, as a judge. The President 
of the Constitutional Court believes that the availability of override is “very 
negative”, and that while this provision is on the books, “you cannot have a 
powerful Court”.145 In an interview, he expressed the hope that “in future this 
will be abolished” and added that it was the unanimous view of all the 
Constitutional Court judges.146 However, there are also views to the opposite, 
by lawyers who are otherwise supporters of a strong and independent role of the 
Constitutional Court. For example, Mr Horatiu Dumitru, now a private lawyer 
and earlier, a lawyer for the government closely involved in the proceedings 
before the Constitutional Court, believes that the override expresses the fact that 
the parliament is “the single representative body”, and that an override debate
139 Schwartz 1993, supra note 19 at p. 176.
140 Article 147 of the Romanian Constitution.
141 Conversation with Prof. Cristian Parvulescu, Bucharest 8 March 2001.
142 Id.
143 Conversation with Prof. Mihai Constantinescu, Bucharest 9 March 2001.
144 Id.






























































































gives the Parliament an opportunity to reconsider the law.147 He also believes 
that the possibility of override does not affect the Court’s decisions.
As an example of reducing the finality of constitutional court decisions of 
unconstitutionality, in order to inject a degree of democratic deliberation into 
the essentially non-democratic process of judicial review one may consider the 
“notwithstanding” provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
This provision, in s. 33 of the Charter, states that “Parliament or the legislature 
of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature 
. . . that the Act or the provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a 
provision included in” the Charter’s catalogue of freedoms and rights. These 
declarations can be in effect for up to five years, which is the longest period of 
time for which a government stays in power without going to the polls, but they 
can be renewed indefinitely. Section 33, admittedly inserted into the 1982 
Charter as a matter of political compromise and used sparingly, may be seen, as 
an American enthusiast of the provision described it, as “an effort to have the 
best of two worlds: an opportunity for a deliberative judicial consideration of a 
difficult and perhaps divisive constitutional issue and [as] an opportunity for 
electorally accountable officials to respond, in the course of ordinary politics, in 
an effective way.”148 The benefits of this approach seem significant: it allows 
the court to register its constitutional protest, puts the burden upon the 
legislature to face the constitutional issue explicitly, symbolically identifies the 
problem in a matter highly visible to the electorate, but does not distort the 
legislative will as a requirement of having supermajority in order to override the 
court’s decision necessarily does. It seems like a good compromise between 
ordinary politics and constitutional concerns, which enhances popular 
deliberation over constitutional norms without distorting the democratic will. If 
we believe that the articulation of constitutional norms is a matter of concern 
not only for the constitutional courts but also for the legislatures, executive 
branches, and the general public, then the s. 33 compromise may be seen as an 
attempt “to make ordinary politics and constitutional law penetrate each 
other”149 in a way that benefits society overall.
It should be acknowledged, however, that the actual experience with the 
“notwithstanding” clause (as contrasted to an ideal theory underlying the clause) 
is, according to a number of Canadian experts, rather disappointing. According 
to Peter Russell: “The legislative override in the Charter is now in very bad 
odor in all parts of the country except Quebec. [Many leading politicians] sense 
the extent to which the public has come to believe the Charter’s rhetoric of
147 Conversation with Mr Horiatiu Dumitru, Bucharest 10 March 2001
148 M. J. Perry, ‘The Constitution, the Courts, and the Question of Minimalism”, 
Northwestern University Law Review 88 (1993): 84-164 at 158.
149 Mark Tushnet, “Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination 




























































































fundamental rights and accept the judiciary’s legitimacy as the final arbiter of 
those rights”.150
The United States Constitution provides for a mechanism of majoritarian 
constraint on judicial review, in the form of the Article III power of Congress to 
regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Theoretically at least, the 
Congress might use this power to foreclose judicial consideration of 
constitutional challenges to legislation but in fact, although some constitutional 
lawyers have no doubts about the constitutionality of such a power of 
foreclosure,151 this has never served as a significant limit upon judicial review. 
There are various reasons, both political and legal, why the Article III power 
never served an analogous role to the Canadian Charter’s section 33 in 
insulating controversial legislation from judicial review.152
But the very fact that such power exists suggests that, even in a system 
which is seen as the model for strong judicial review, “finality” of the Court’s 
decisions, which invalidate legislative acts, is qualified. Some writers believe 
that the Supreme Court’s decisions are never really the “last word” on the 
matter. Rather, they serve to initiate a complex dialogue between the courts and 
the elected branches of government, in which the latter may attempt to counter 
the effects of the decision. In a recent study of such interaction between the 
Supreme Court, the legislative and the executive, Neal Devins has shown that 
the legislative and executive branches have successfully restricted the impact of 
the Supreme Court’s landmark decision on abortion,153 and in consequence, 
have made the Court reexamine and qualify its own, earlier decision. As Devins 
concludes, “once a Supreme Court has decided a case, a constitutional dialogue 
takes place between the Court and elected government, often resulting in a later 
decision more to the liking of political actors.”154
Devins is correct in saying that, on issues where constitutional 
interpretation is at stake, “the last word is never spoken,”155 and that the 
articulation of a true meaning of constitutional norms is as much a task of the
15(1 Peter H. Russell, ‘The Growth of Canadian Judicial Review and the Commonwealth and 
American Experiences”, in Donald W. Jackson & C. Neal Tate, Comparative Judicial Review 
and Public Policy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992): 29-39 at 36. The Canadian 
politicians to whom Russell refers in this quote are the (then) Prime Minister Mulroney and 
several provincial premiers. For skepticism about this clause, as a vehicle of non-finality, see 
also James Allan, “Bills of Rights and Judicial Power -  a Liberal’s Quandary”, Oxford 
Journal ofl^egal Studies 16 (1996): 337-352 at 350 n. 59.
151 Martin H. Redish, “Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate 
Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination”, Villanova 
Law Review 27 (1982): 900-928. .
152 See Tushnet, supra note 149 at p. 287.
153 Neal Devins, Shaping Constitutional Values (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996).
154 Id. at p. 7.




























































































legislature, the executive, and the general public, as it is of the Supreme Court. 
It is also the case that the legislative and the executive branch have numerous 
methods of prevailing over the Court in its interpretation of constitutional 
rights,156 although sometimes it may take a lot of time, as for example, the 
protracted resolution of the child labor issue in the United States indicates.157
Finally, one should add that the finality of tribunals’ decisions may be 
seen by the legislators sometimes as an advantage rather than as a 
countervailing, antagonistic power. The fact that legislators work “in the 
shadow of judicial review” may give them a good excuse for not taking the 
decisions which the electorate demands — by anticipating the tribunal’s 
objections or by shifting the responsibility for an unpopular decision to the 
tribunal. It may provide a convenient excuse: “We wanted to adopt this law, or 
this policy, but the tribunal would not let us do it.” Or, conversely, the tribunal’s 
strong authority may free the parliament to behave irresponsibly. Individual 
members of a parliament can signal their “right” attitudes (valued by the 
majority of their constituency) by voting for proposals which they know will not 
actually become law because the tribunal will strike them down as 
unconstitutional.158 Ironically, the tribunal’s power to prevail over the 
legislature may serve the legislature’s interests quite well, although perhaps not 
for the right reasons.
Conclusions
As Alec Stone Sweet wrote recently in his excellent study of the leading 
Western European constitutional courts:
It would be a mistake to dismiss parliamentary adjudication of 
rights as inherently less meaningful or less ‘judicial’ than the 
deliberations of a constitutional court. Parliament and the court are 
doing more or less the same thing, speaking in more or less the 
same language and working through more or less the same 
normative material. . . . When the court annuls a bill, it substitutes
156 See generally, L.G. Ratner, “Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional 
Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction”, Villanova Law Review 27 (1981): 929-58 at pp. 930- 
32.
157 In 1916 and 1919, Congress attempted to strike at child labor indirectly, using the 
interstate commerce and taxing powers, and the Supreme Court invalidated both of these 
attempts, in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), and in Child Labor Tax Case, 259 
U.S. 20 (1922), respectively; in 1938 Congress returned to the original 1916 bill struck down 
in Hammer, and a unanimous Court approved child labor legislation in 1941.
158 For an example of such behavior in the American context, see J.R. Macey, “Thayer, 
Nagel, and the Founders’ Design: A Comment”, Northwestern University Law Review 88 




























































































its own reading of rights, and its own policy goals, for those of the 
parliamentary majority.159
The observation by Stone Sweet has a universal application, and of 
course applies equally to constitutional courts in CEE. The decision about 
allocating authority should always be based on a comparison of the relative 
virtues and vices of different institutions, rather than by looking at various 
institutions one at a time. Even if we are sceptical about the competence of the 
legislative process in the rights context, this is not enough to support a shift to 
the judiciary. We first must be satisfied that the judiciary will provide a superior 
alternative to the legislature.160 And in making such an assessment, it is 
important to guard against the temptation to compare an ideal picture of 
judicial review with a non-ideal world of legislative decision making.161
The concern underlying this Working Paper has been that this insight has 
never been fully internalised in the constitutional discourse in and about 
constitutional courts in CEE. As a consequence, the vexed question of their 
legitimacy to undertake robust scrutiny of parliamentary statutes has never been 
addressed in a fully satisfactory way. What is more, the very question never has 
been seen as a particularly important one, as the recent fundamental book by 
Herman Schwartz indicates.162 Schwartz conducts a thorough, admirably well 
researched analysis of the five (arguably) most important constitutional courts 
in the region (in Poland, Hungary, Russia, Bulgarian and Slovakia) and yet he 
never seems to appreciate the urgency of addressing the legitimacy problem. 
The fact that “the injection of a judge’s own value judgements is necessary in 
more than ‘borderline’ cases”163 does not seem to trouble him. As this comes 
from a sensitive, knowledgeable and committed expert, this approach may be 
seen as indicative of the whole approach to which this Working Paper responds.
To be sure, the “record card” of constitutional courts in Central and 
Eastern Europe, as far as the protection of constitutional rights and the policing 
of constitutional allocation of powers are concerned, is on balance positive.164 
While there have been some important decisions in which these courts reversed 
liberal legislative choices and substituted them with their own, more restrictive 
articulations of constitutional rights, and many cases of missed opportunities to 
rectify non-liberal legal provisions, on the whole, the correctives introduced by
159 Alec Stone Sweet, “Constitutional Dialogues: Protecting Rights in France, Germany, Italy 
and Spain”, in Sally J. Kenney, William M. Reisinger & John C. Reitz (eds), Constitutional 
Dialogues In Comparative Perspective (London: Macmillan 1999), pp. 8-41 at p. 26.
160 For a forceful expression of this view, see Neil K. Komesar, ‘Taking Institutions 
Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis”, Univ. o f Chicago Law 
Review 51 (1984), pp. 366-446 at p. 376.
161 See Griffin, supra note 103 at p. 123.
162 Schwartz, supra note 1.
163 Id. p. 88.




























































































the courts must be viewed as positive. More often than not, the change made by 
the courts in specific areas should be applauded by observers concerned with a 
robust, strong protection of civil and political rights, and with the integrity of 
constitutional separation of powers. This is, at least, the case of the most activist 
and independent courts of the region: in Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Czech 
Republic, and -  to a lesser degree -  in the Baltic states, Slovakia, Romania and 
Bulgaria.
But the substantial successes of constitutional courts do not go all the way 
to address the legitimacy deficit. As Burt Neubome wrote: “When substantive- 
review judges identify values and totally insulate them from majority will, the 
troublesome question of why judges are better than other officials in identifying 
and weighing fundamental values cannot be avoided.”165 This is precisely the 
issue which both the constitutional courts and constitutional doctrine in the 
region have yet to address.
165 Burt Neubome, “Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United 
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